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THE ISLAMIC REVIEW
Between Ourselves ....

THE COVER

The picture on the Cover is that of the pilgrims in the street which connects the two small hills of Safa and Marwa situated near Mecca, where each pilgrim when he first arrives at Mecca performs the devotional act of Sa'ı — running between these two hills. This act commemorates the running to and from in quest of water for her baby son, Ishmael, by Hagar when she was left there by Abraham.

★

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The Islamic Review

January : 1954

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"THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN" — A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA

2nd November, 1953 — an Epoch-making Date in the Annals of Islam

Islam as seen by non-Muslims and Muslims

The quietist attitude towards life in all Muslim countries resulting in fatalism that continued to pervade their daily conduct during the last few centuries, especially since the sack of Baghdad by the Mongol hordes of Hulagu in 1258 C.E., is now loosening its grip. Their passive outlook on life had become so symbolic of their pattern of life that Western writers and thinkers had come to believe that Islam was a religion that put a spell around its adherents, that it thwarted their material progress, that it turned them into mechanical robots. This was their standing reproach and rebuke to Islam. Men like Lord Cromer who came into close contact with Muslims in Egypt went so far as to say that if the Egyptians did change, it would not be to Islam they would owe their allegiance; for Islam was unchanged, changeless, static and fatalistic. This was and is the conception of Islam in the non-Muslim world.

But Islam was not only credited with those outside its fold. Its own adherents, especially those who could see what was taking place outside the frontiers of Muslim countries, had developed a split personality. They had begun to doubt if Islam was a religion at all for the twentieth century. They were in two minds as to whether they should break away from Islam and respond to the urge and pull exerted on them from the non-Muslim world. It is evident that this mental struggle was a heavy drain on their constructive energy. These Muslims, when they turned to their history, found to their amazement that with the exception of the period of about thirty years of the first four rightly-guided Caliphas, the history of the Meccas and the Hijaz, the first forty years of Islam, could be matched with the Magna Charta, the French Revolution, the Bolshievist Revolution, each of which had done so much to improve the lot of the common man. It appeared as if a spell of death had been cast on the peoples of Islam by which they were deprived of all spiritual beneficence. By whom and by what? To add to this came the enslavement of the world of Islam, country by country, by Europe. It is true that in the midst of this darkness there are to be seen some solitary figures, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, to name but one of a score of others during the last hundred years or so, who had the vision to see that the world of Islam was heading towards a complete extinction. They in their own places worked hard to arouse the Muslims to the danger that lay ahead. They saw that the Muslim countries had been subjugated not only politically by the Western powers but also they would soon be in a position to destroy the soul of the Muslims. Christian missionaries swarmed the Muslim countries to preach the so-called message of Jesus Christ. Nothing seemed to avail. All were agreed that it was just a question of time when the conquest of Muslim countries would be complete from all points of view.

The epoch-making date of 2nd November 1953

It is in the context of this state of affairs that we can appraise rightly the true value of the historic and epoch-making announcement of the Parliament of Pakistan when on the 2nd of November 1953 it decided that Pakistan would be known by the title of "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan". This decision, which was in the mission and message of Islam, but it has equally disappointed, even angered, those who were convinced that the world of Islam was about to sink into oblivion.

The new style of Pakistan is the first of its kind ever to be adopted by a Muslim country since the days of the first four Caliphs (632-656 C.E.) in which the emphasis is not on individuals but upon an idea — the ideology of Islam. By this step of Pakistan the Muslim peoples who have for centuries been lulled to sleep so that they lost consciousness of their true aim and purpose in life and were hypnotized to accept as Islamic un-Islamic institutions, such as kingship and landlordism, have shown that they are anxious to be on the watch on their political and social development.

Never before in the history of Islam had such a revolutionary idea as contained in the phrase, “The Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, found expression in any Muslim country. As a working idea this new style of Pakistan has the potentialities of galvanizing the people of Pakistan into a fresh life in the first place, and also others in the second place, and of becoming fully conscious of their responsibilities in the world of today and of contributing to its solution. It is no exaggeration to say that the new style of Pakistan has so far found an echo in some Muslim countries. It has inspired the Egyptian weekly of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Durra, Cairo, to call upon the present regime of Egypt to follow the path of Islam and to declare Egypt. This new style of Pakistan reaffirms the faith of its people in the ultimate destiny of Islam and its determination that the Muslims are not just there to imitate others and its conviction that Islam is a distinct ideology on which to base its programme for its own use and for others, if they wish to avail themselves of it.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan cannot be a theocratic State in the accepted sense of the word. In this connection it is not out of place to examine briefly the criticism of those who see in the new style of Pakistan retrogression, irrationalism and the evils of theocracy. Their denunciation of Pakistan’s new style is based on a misapprehension of Islam—a confusion of thought which the word theocracy causes in their minds. A rudimentary knowledge of Islam will convince anyone of the fact that Pakistan cannot be a theocratic State even if it wanted to be so; for in Islam there is no priesthood in the Hindoo and Christian sense. No section in Islam, the learned in the religious lore of Islam included, could claim to be the sole interpreters of the mind of God. The word theocracy, if understood in its etymological sense, could be applied to Islam, but it is not in this sense that this word is used in the European languages. Theocracy, meaning originally the rule of God, has come to mean the rule of the priests, who arrogate to themselves the right to interpret the mind of God in the absence of the word of God. Unlike the Christians and other denominations who do not possess their scriptures in their original pristine purity, the Muslims do not suffer from this discrepancy. The Qur’an is there in the original as revealed to Muhammad. Consequently all Muslims have a right to their views till the majority overrules them by equally well-corroborated views from the Qur’an and the words and practice of the Prophet. It is clear from this that theocracy as understood in Europe is quite foreign to Islam. By declaring Pakistan to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the people of Pakistan have only affirmed their faith and belief in the fact that they will be guided in their decisions and deliberations over their daily problems by the Qur’an and the Hadith. It is not intended that they are inspired by the dictates of any God as contained in the Qur’an. History has shown time and again that man who has his basic nature to contend with requires to fix his gaze on a transcendent God whose conception and attributes elevate him above himself. To condemn Pakistan for laying emphasis on a transcendent conception of life is neither medieval nor a retrograde step; for it is neither supported by fact nor by human experience.
AN ISLAMIC STATE – A REALIZABLE IDEAL

The Nine Guiding Principles for the Exercise of Sovereignty in an Islamic State

By M. RAIHAN SHARIF, M.A., M.B.A. (Pennsylvania)

Organic character of culture

The suitable laboratory for the unique experiment of regaining the lost horizon is, to a balanced and dispassionate mind, an Islamic State, the features of which, again, are both interesting and important for analysis and consideration.

The conception of a State in Islam, as a modern sceptic would have us believe, is not organic, but, I would add, not organic in the narrow sense which permeates Western political science. Islam, as a comprehensive philosophy, may indeed be treated as a body of principles, deductive in nature, and as such standing largely as exponents of ideas, rather than as interpreters of actual conditions. An Islamic principle is, more or less, an exponent of an idea, capable of determining a programme of action. But does that mean that the State conceived by or following from such principles should be other than organic?

In some quarters, it is pleaded that non-Islamic cultures are wholly organic, like trees, for which it is absurd to predict which direction their branches will take, but Islamic culture is not organic in that sense; for it is essentially the instrument of an idea symbolizing a postulate and a programme. On the basis of such contention, one non-Muslim political thinker has laboured hard to construct the theory of "one umma, one State". Since Islam represents one idea, and politics and religion are inextricably mingled in that idea, there cannot be, according to him, more than one umma (or common entity of Muslim brotherhood), nor can there be more than one State, called an Islamic State. The theory is, on the face of it, a plausible one, but seems to have been overdone to the extent of rendering it a bad-intentioned one, particularly in the practical part of the muddled analysis.

In fairness, the organic character of Islamic culture cannot be ignored by a scientific observer and analyst without qualms within. To take the same analogy, other cultures may appear to be like the banyan or oak tree, for which it may be difficult to predict which direction its branches will take. But does it not imply a clear sense of frustration and helpless surrender to nature — that unexplained Sphinx — to put an end to sound planning of the growth of the tree, if and when necessary, and as far as practicable? Islamic culture, on the other hand, may be likened, if at all, to a date or palm tree — indeed remarkably reminiscent of Arab civilization — the direction its branches will take being roughly of a predictable nature. While unpredictability may mean frustration, predictability may be a positive asset for human planning in conformity with the spirit of nature. Should we, then, deny the conception of organic growth to a date or palm tree, simply because of the predictable nature of its branches?

A non-Muslim theory

Now, coming down to the premises proper, it may be possible, philosophically and historically, to build up the concept of "one umma, one State"; but what is very important to remember is that it is hardly an invariable conclusion. Two postulates are, indeed, very fundamental for an

---

1 Islamic Culture, Hyderabad-Deccan, India, for January 1937 (p. 9).
2 Islamic Literature, Lahore, Pakistan, for September 1951 (pp. 497-502).
Islamic order, political, social and economic: (a) one faith should lead to one Muslim brotherhood, and (b) the link between politics and religion is indissoluble. In the light of these two postulates, it is possible to fashion up the concept of one political entity out of a common Muslim brotherhood, and an ideal of one Islamic State. It is also possible to argue that a concrete picture of such an ideal is hard to imagine, unless on the basis of a rigid levelling down of all differences and peculiarities of the distinct individual entities, formed and in the process of formation, on the globe today. Further, if the Muslim jurist Mawardi’s fourteenth century researches promote the construction of such an ideal, there is, in fact, nothing unusual or revolutionary in it. Mawardi’s, however, was a spectacular achievement in substantially contributing to the fixed political system which characteristically resulted from the intensive endeavours of juristic scholars under the first Abbasids. But it is not fair to assume that the final say in matters of political institutions or constitutional features, for all time to come, has been embodied in Mawardi, who ought not have dismissed, inter alia, the possibility of one Caliph of Islam. For that is not all that history has to tell any expounder of new theories.

Lessons of Islamic History

Let us look to history and the evolution of the principle of election in Muslim political life. It is well known that the Prophet Muhammad did not name his successor. On the death of the Prophet, the issue of the election of a Caliph assumed a paramount importance. When there was a seeming schism between the supporters of Abu Bakr, whom the Prophet gave the leading position in spiritual and religious matters, and the supporters of Sa’d Ibn ‘Ubaidah, who sought the leadership of Medina for their leader, ‘Umar’s weighty support in the general meeting of all tribes in favour of Abu Bakr imparted the decisive effect and carried away the majority to his side. All then agreed to elect Abu Bakr (632-4 C.E.) as the representative of the Prophet. The following day, a general election took place in which the entire community elected Abu Bakr. Thus the first election, crucial in nature, created a momentous precedent for the subsequent history of the Caliphate, and later led to the cardinal principle of constitutional law, e.g., the principle of free election by the assembled community and its confirmation by general homage. The importance of this institution of election is clear, even in the Umayyad days of degeneration, and amply proved by the fact that out of fourteen Umayyad rulers, only four could have their sons as successors, and that again on the basis of plebiscite on the recommendation of the Caliph. It is reliably narrated that Umar I (632-4 C.E.) once said, "If the election of a Caliph is effected without all Muslims taking part in it, the election is null and void." Can democracy of modern origin go farther than this? To make the picture complete, I cannot resist the temptation of quoting here the inaugural Caliphate address ascribed to Yazid III (d. 744 C.E.), handed down to us as an outstanding document of explanation of the position of the chief executive, Caliph: "O people, I pledge myself to erect no buildings, to let out on lease none of your rivers, to build no palace, to hoard up no riches, to enrich neither wife nor child. From me is due to you your annuity year by year, and provisions month by month, so that prosperity among Muslims may increase, and those who live far away may participate in it just as well as those living near. Should...


I keep my promise, you are in duty bound to listen to me and cheerfully obey me, to support and protect me. If, on the other hand, I do not keep my word, you are at liberty to depose me; only you should give me timely warning, and were I to mend my ways, then should accept my apology. Should you, however, know a man of tried temper who willingly offers what I have offered to you, choose, then, such a one, and, if you so desire, I shall be the first to do him homage and render him obedience."

The ultimate sovereignty in an Islamic State, in the past, too, was vested in the general assembly of the people, who had, indeed, the power of deposition. Since the second Caliph Umar’s assumption of the title Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), the idea of the representative of the people was shaped gradually to have a rightful place in the concept of the representative of the Prophet. The extreme view of the Kharijites was a part of that evolution; according to them, even the meanest of all Muslims could have the right to be elected Caliph, though a section of this school, again, went so far as to deny the need of any sovereign or Caliph. The orthodox school, however, succeeded in obtaining a consensus of opinion and established the principle that the highest authority in all such issues rested with the community as a whole, in consonance with the traditional dictum, "It is not permissible to hold that the entire community can commit an error of judgment.

The practicable formulation of the principle is to depend on the judgment of the representatives of the community in the place of that of the assemblage of the entire community, which is absurd in the present days of big States with millions of people living in far-flung areas. But a vital issue, even in modern days, can be made the issue of a general plebiscite or referendum. Suppose the judgment of the entire Muslim population in a Muslim country or in the Muslim world as a whole is called for now or in the near future. Is it likely, then, that the verdict of the plebiscite will invariably coincide with Mawardi’s ruling of "one umma, one Caliph", or invariably again with the Kharijite demand for "one umma, no Caliph"? Departure from either Mawardi or from the radical wing of Kharijites does not involve sacrifice of the indispensable in Islamic principles. On the other hand, it is just possible that the judgment of the community may also coincide with Mawardi’s, provided other things are equal, or at best, when conditions justify the coincidence. And if, at all, political conditions permit, the coincidence of that judgment will be highly desirable. That is the historical truth to keep in mind if one cares for history at all. Blended with the philosophical counterpart, the conclusion of "one umma, one State" cannot logically be an invariable one; the above analysis leads us to this conclusion of inconclusiveness in the theory advanced by the non-Muslim theorist.

Practical difficulties examined

It is, however, as wonderful as wonder itself that the conception of "one Islamic State" could be supposed — by what stretch of the imagination we cannot say — to throw "a bombshell into the Islamic world". We shall discuss the practical consequences depicted by the said theorist.

(A) It is apprehended that creation of one Islamic State for the Muslim world will involve practical uncertainty and extensive warfare in the geographical belt from Morocco to Indonesia. Such fears are based on complete ignorance of Muslim brotherhood, called umma, be it confined to a compact territory, or be it widely dispersed in the world, covering the present political frontiers of Morocco, Tripoli, Egypt and the other Arab States, Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malay...
and Indonesia. The question of Muslim minorities in China, India and the Soviet Union is, of course, entirely different, and as such should not in fairness be mixed up with the issues arising out of the concept of "one Islamic State." The creation of one Islamic State can by no means stand any parallelism with imperialistic or any other sort of territorial expansionism that is, often, fraught with political chaos and bloody warfare; for simply the question of conquest or subjugation does not arise. This implies some sort of an internal readjustment in the political organization or organizations required by the change. The conception of a far-flung belt Government will necessarily be federal or confederal in nature having a large degree of elasticity to accommodate the differences of details. There cannot be any appreciable practical difficulty of organizing a large federation constituted of sovereign or semi-sovereign States. When the British Commonwealth of Nations, apart from its present expanded form, could function with similar administration and to the best interests of the dissimilar peoples concerned, what earthly reasons can prevent spiritually similar peoples of a large belt from integrating politically? Political unity is, as political history has proved time and time again, the outcome of genuine political consciousness. Provided such consciousness grows in a region, however wide that region may be, the political alignment can only be a matter of course. Even in ordinary political jargon, religion is regarded as a very powerful factor in the growth of political consciousness. Leaving aside the issue of the dynamic faith of Islam in which individual, social, political and spiritual consciousness is wedded together in the nature of "warp and woof", even ordinary partial analysis of political facts in the wide region leads irresistibly to a common political entity.

Some barriers to that commonness of all-sided consciousness may, however, remain in the transitional period. It will be the responsibility of any individual States within the hypothetical belt, desirous of initiative, to remove those barriers at the outset. The President of the Muslim League of Pakistan might have anticipated things a bit too quickly in pleading for diplomatic non-recognition of the present Muslim States by Pakistan as independent sovereign entities. In the immediate present, assuming Pakistan to take the initiative, it will have to be needed for cultural, religious and social understanding, collaboration and cooperation among the Muslim States; and in this Pakistan is required to play an active role through either existing agencies or diplomatic links. Undoubtedly the barriers of common understanding and consciousness should be consciously removed as a preparatory stage for closer economic and, if possible, political co-operation amongst the Muslim States of the world.

At length, the birth of one Islamic State, constituted of them or others, may follow in the natural course of things. In a world that is thinking profoundly of surrendering a part of the political sovereignty enjoyed by individual States in the interest of building permanent peace, is it impracticable to have one political organization for one Muslim brotherhood?

(B) Fortunately, the possibility of such an Islamic State is frankly admitted by the non-Muslim author, who, however apprehends the second practical difficulty in the nomination of the chief executive, the Caliph. The question of one or more caliphs, as has been analytically shown earlier, remains open for decision by the Commonwealth of Muslims on the strength of traditions and political expediency. It has also been shown earlier that the institution of election is not incompatible with the position of a Caliph. Islamic history has amply refuted the contention — "an elected Caliph is hardly feasible in the Islamic State".

Differences in the size of territory and population in the constituent units can hardly be made the ground for not electing an executive in a State when the principle of election is accepted. On the other hand it should be stated that the Islamic way of nomination is also tantamount to election by representatives, or by representatives of representatives, who should be the best elements of the entire State, so that in the ultimate analysis there is no incompatibility between election and nomination. Hence, depending on expediency, the judgment of the community of Muslims will have a wide scope and may turn this way or that.

(C) It need not be denied there were controversies in the past between the Shi'ahs and the Sunnies, the former believing in an hereditary Caliphate while the latter were opposed to the principle of an hereditary Caliphate. Conflicts and contenstions were rife in favour for or against the deposition of a Caliph. But even Mawardi, whose reasoning has helped the non-Muslim theorist, established the doctrine of replacement of a sinful Caliph by a worthier one. Another jurist of the contemporary period, Ibn Jam'aah, on the other hand, gave his judgment against Mawardi's doctrine on grounds of practical difficulties. But, in fact, the absence of the doctrine of deposition proved disastrous in practical politics resulting in insurrections and assassinations of Caliphs. Constitutionally, therefore, it will not be expedient for an Islamic State to ignore the provision for the deposition of the chief executive in the present age. Controversies or conflicts, if any, have not persisted. If their traces are still noticed, they are not indelible.

(D) It is contended that the theory of an Islamic State precludes the idea of full-fledged citizenship of non-Muslims. Indeed, it is true that in the largest interest of a State, its highest executive should belong to the majority community or majority part in a modern State. There is nothing peculiar about the Caliph of an Islamic State being chosen from Muslims alone. There is no country in the world today that has set the political precedent of democratically choosing the highest executive from amongst the minorities. The meaning of equality of political rights can hardly be identified with merely the holding of the highest post of the executive, who, being held as the defender of Islam, has essentially to be a Muslim in an Islamic State.

But to all intents and purposes non-Muslims who are not inimical to Muslims have been allotted a privileged position of "sacred trust" over and above the political rights they deserve. The Qur'ân has asked Muslims to be generous and to deal justly and kindly with such non-Muslims (60:8). One saying of the Prophet Muhammad is known to be: "They — Zimmis (the protected) — enjoy the same rights as we, and have the same responsibilities. They are citizens and they must participate in both rights and duties, prosperity and adversity." It is also said that the last words of the Prophet were: "Take care of the rights of women, slaves and Zimmis." Hence, in the light of such a position accorded to non-Muslims, it is amazing to suggest that they are debarred from enjoying equal political rights in an Islamic State. Even if the constitution of an Islamic State does not debar a non-Muslim from being elected a Caliph or Imam, will it in fact be practicable to have a non-Muslim to shoulder the responsibility of a Caliph without the necessary fitness of faith? A secular State like India or China or Russia may only ambiguously say that there is no bar to Muslims (who are a minority there) being the highest executives, though they mean within themselves that Muslims will never be able to hold that position in fact.

6 Khuda Bukhsh, supra, p. 270.
7 Islamic Literature, Lahore, Pakistan, for May 1950, p. 483.
(E) It has been contended that in the scheme of a practical Islamic State, the Caliph cannot be a real Caliph, nor can there be real provincial autonomy in the federal framework. Nothing can be hollower than such a claim, when the concrete demonstration of the magnificent functioning of a federation composed of far-flung regions separated by long distances has already proved it otherwise, in no uncertain terms, in Pakistan. Cannot the executive in Pakistan be a real one in the two distant wings? Rather, owing to the far-flung character of the federation, it should be appreciated that State autonomy is likely to be more real than usual, with no decline, of course, in the position of the executive.

(F) The problem of Isma'ilis, as a separate sect with their own Imams, has also been advanced as a practical difficulty for an Islamic State. Further it has been urged that the Islamic State cannot copy the United States of America or the Soviet Union in having one State and many Churches. It should be realized that an essential common ground exists even between Isma'ilis and Sunni Muslims, beyond which a little more autonomy to the Isma'ilis may easily solve the problem. Or, if that does not suffice, there may even be an independent organization to suit their otherwise uncompromisable doctrines of faith in the body politic in the transitional period; and this may even take the form of a separate sovereign State, when there is no clear prohibition of more than one Caliph or executive for a divided community. In the ultimate resort, such divisions are likely to be eventually wiped out by efforts towards unification. Granting, then, the separate existence of a sect like the Isma'ilis, links of confederation are almost sure to be maintained by the essential commonness of outlook and attitude to life.

One Islamic State possible

More appropriately, I think, these difficulties should be straightened out in the very process of building the preconditions for the establishment of one Islamic State. The Qur'an has held out an unmistakable call to humanity for organizing conferences of all sects and shades of opinion to achieve a common understanding in religion (16:125). No difficulties are formidable enough to refuse to melt in the fire of urgent need. If Western Europe, consisting of a medley of heterogeneous elements, could think of a common Parliament, if the United Nations could come into being from the deliberations of the Dumbarton Oaks, or if the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank could grow out of the Bretton Woods parleys to look after ordered development and stability in the monetary and economic systems in the world, it is but many times less difficult to throw a bridge of common understanding amongst the so-called groups of Shi'ahs and Sunnis, Mu'tazzilites, Kharijites and Isma'ilis. In that event, the problem of having more than one Islamic State and more than one chief executive for a common community is likely to disappear within a reasonable length of time. For, the foundations of common understanding are already postulated in all Islamic societies irrespective of sect, differences of views and differences of so-called nationality and outlook. One eminent writer has remarked 8 that Muhammad was the first to see the stupendous power of public prayer as a unification of culture, and there can be little doubt that the power of Islam is due, to a large extent, to the obedience of the faithful to this inviolable rule of five prayers. The giving of alms to the poor is also a means of developing a sense of brotherhood. So likewise the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which entailed so much hardship in the beginning, proved in the end a great aid to unification; for men of different tribes and races met at Mecca with a common purpose and in a common worship, and a feeling of brotherhood is but engendered in the process."

Disciplined in these processes of unification, is it difficult to originate a World Muslim Congress either following the holy pilgrimage each year at Mecca or by rotation in the important Muslim States, to mark the milestones of progress towards the goal of political unification? Such a possibility is sure and the suggestions of "bombshell" designed to deter or delay it are likely rather to impart a wholesome effect on more serious thought towards Islamic consolidation and unification, and eventually lead to the establishment of the Islamic State earlier than was anticipated.

But it should be clearly realized that the birth of an Islamic State in the modern context signifies several steps forward from the existing forms of government that had made a meaningless distinction between public and private life and have accepted the responsibility of public life alone for realizing short-sighted objectives. Citizens in an Islamic State are guided by lasting principles, only one of which consists in the organization of public affairs including the form of government on the basis of "mutual consultation". This principle, an important one in itself, was the keystone of progress in the glorious past. It was applied fully by the Prophet in his private and public life, and was also considerably acted upon by the early rulers of Islam. Modern varieties of representative democracy are but an attempt to apply the same principle, one-sidedly, on State affairs.

Guiding principles for right conduct in private and public life

In view of the higher ideal of life, conceived in Islam (which I have termed long-term planning of life), organizing the public life alone is not enough. In a community that plans for the long-term objective of God's pleasure, not only the leaders but the led, too, should be thoroughly disciplined both for public and private behaviour. In such a scheme of things, the few spiritual gymnasts who might make big strides in disciplining themselves and reach high grades of achievement and development cannot compensate for the low and inhuman development of the common run of the people. The common run is also subjected to the rigid tests of application of nine principles, in a general way, for right conduct in private and public life.9

1. PRINCIPLE OF FAITH. The first step towards developing a personality to suit the real kind of planning of life conceived in Islam consists of faith — faith in the kindness and powers of an All-knowing, All-powerful, Omnipresent Divinity that appreciates good and despises evil.

✓ 2. PRINCIPLE OF TRUST. In the search for real values, people of faith should trust in that Divinity as a finality of all values. In a labyrinth of false standards, they will otherwise stumble, falter and fret without the real light of guidance. All other truths should, therefore, be reconciled to and controlled by the supreme truth.

3. PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. God's fundamental laws should be obeyed by one and all; otherwise, the moral development of a person is not possible. In general terms, major breaches of God's law will have to be consciously avoided as a first measure which will qualify a man for subtle pursuits of God's directives in every sphere of life in the next stage of development. It should be noted that even in the first stage, meant for the average man, offences against

8 Emotion as the Basis of Civilization (as quoted in Islamic Literature, Lahore, for November 1949, pp. 169-70).
9 The Qur'an, 43: 36-40. (A. Yusuf 'Ali's commentaries may be noted alongside.)

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sex are to be avoided. A careful study of the relation between man and woman will reveal the ideal golden mean struck by the Qur'anic laws of legitimate restraint, to be observed both by man and by woman. It is hardly necessary to point out that Islam neither aims at complete segregation with the "iron girdle" brand of chastity, nor of the unbridled promiscuity of the Western brand of false freedom. Rules of a definite nature have been provided, at least for this issue, in Islam, and these human beings will violate only at the peril of their own balanced development.

4. PRINCIPLE OF FORGIVENESS. Every man must weigh himself, and especially before weighing others. Realizing one's own deficiencies and imperfections, one should be able to interpret others' shortcomings in a right way. Even though one is severely tried by provocation and anger, it is right to forgive others, provided forgiveness does not imply encouragement of a wrong cause. Such a principle gives ability to a person to face the situations of life, public and private, in a becoming and just manner.

5. PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE. The ordinary man and woman must be ready for the expedition of knowledge—knowledge that is too robust to shut out the long-term aspect of life and its relation to God's plan. The sources are "God's signs" interpreted in the nature of various sciences and arts. But the interpretations must not be one-sidedly mundane.

6. PRINCIPLE OF PRAYER. Everybody must establish prayers regularly by way of a personal communion with the Ultimate Reality. This helps an individual to develop inner powers of perception of right knowledge and protects him or her from unseemly behaviour, individual or social. When publicly organized, prayer implies a great cementing force for the entire community.

7. PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL CONSULTATION. The conduct of an individual in an Islamic society is essentially of an open character, leaving no scope for insincerity or its sweeter cousin, diplomacy. Their conduct should, in the best interests of social welfare, be determined by mutual consultation in all common affairs, in the household as between members, in business affairs as between partners, parties or the body of shareholders, or in State affairs as between the rulers and the ruled; for the Government administrator is between the various departments or within each department to preserve unity of purpose. This symbolizes the democratic attitude to all common problems of life, be they political, economic, moral, spiritual or of any other kind.

8. PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY. Every individual must also practise charity out of all kinds of endowments. The poorer or weaker sections of society have a claim over others to be helped and strengthened by unlimited charity, out of wealth or gifts or talents or opportunities. The payment of zakat is based on this principle, and is enjoined on all with specific rules of guidance for various kinds of wealth. But everybody is asked to spend in charity voluntarily beyond the obligatory payment of zakat without any limit, to wipe out poverty and remove the distress of the needy.

9. PRINCIPLE OF SELF-PRESERVATION. When an oppressive wrong is inflicted, individuals — men and women — should be able to depend on self-help and self-defence. This principle proclaims the very high value attaching to individualism in the "Islamic framework and excels even Mills' postulate of democracy that it is possible to get the best of democracy only when the individuals themselves are ready to stand up to safeguard their rights and interests. The individual may have to stand up, as Mr. Yusuf Ali points out, against an oppressor: (a) for his own rights that are being trampled, (b) for the rights of others within his knowledge, and, similarly, a community may be required to stand up against an oppressor, (c) for its rights collectively, or (d) for the rights of other communities or groups that are threatened or molested. According to this principle of Islamic society, people can never be cowed down to submission against their will; and, as such, it is firmly opposed to the idea of compromise with a wrong or ignoble cause.

Their applications — why and how

It will be clear from a close study of the principles enunciated above that the seventh and ninth principles have formed the foundation of modern democracy with which the great powers of the world today are priding themselves upon the perfection of their political creed. But, leaving other important aspects of life alone, modern secular democracies can hope at the best to achieve a limited measure of success. That is why the whole armoury of nine principles have been provided, in Islam, in the natural fitness of things, to enable a human society to achieve the fullest measure of it. Divorced from the other principles, simple secular democracy in any form falls so deplorably short of the real goal that Iqbal's cry should be treated only as a mild warning:

Jalal-e-Pashahi ho ke Jhumri Tamasho ho,
Juda ho Din Siyasat se tu rah jati hai Chengezi
(Being the splendour of monarchy or show of democracy.
On separation of religion from politics there remains Chengezi, i.e., has the characteristics of Chengezh.)

When, therefore, social planning is based on the above nine principles taken together, the social organization is likely to stand on the surest foundations of solvency and perfect development of society. In the actual ordering of concrete institutions or policies, there may indeed be variations in the past applications and the present of future ones; but the principles, as such, are to be treated as indispensable in themselves.

System of Law in an Islamic State

The laws for an Islamic State that are planned on the basis of the above principles will be derived and deduced from four sources: (a) Qur'anic principles and regulations (b) Traditions of the Prophet called Sunnah, (c) Ijmā' or the unanimous agreement of the community or Doctors of Law, and (d) Qiyas, or reasoning by analogy or deductions. The entire system of law has been called Sharī'at or Shar', and may well be adopted for the present and future purposes of a modern society with the real perspective of balanced social planning. For the system is not, as is ordinarily supposed, a rigidly fixed one to defy adjustment to new conditions and situations of life. Dr. I. H. Qureshi remarks:

"The Shar' included within its fold three main principles, two immutable and one mutable. The immutable principles are the Qur'ān and the authentic Hadith of the Prophet, the latter, according to the Muslims, is not so much an enlargement as an interpretation of the principles enunciated in the revelation. The mutable factor in the interpretation of these principles, which has been arrived at by human reason to apply them to the changing needs of humanity in different conditions. It is wrong, therefore, to say that the Shar' is entirely immutable. The first two principles of it certainly are immutable, but the third principle which is so necessary for the application of Islamic principles to our own lives, must necessarily be progressive." In the body of Islamic law known to us today, there is a considerable contribution of this third principle, and it needs re-consideration for being applied in circumstances which have so considerably altered . . . However, after a lapse of many centuries, with changing conditions, whereas the immutable
Principles upon which the Shar' is based continued to be valid, the line of reasoning which led to the interpretation of those eternal principles was not always in keeping with the progress that human knowledge had made. To leave the courts to decide what is in accordance with Islamic law, it is necessary to define Islamic law properly and to separate the grain from the husk.10

As a matter of fact, Ijma' and Qiyas are two important processes of interpretation and application of the principles of Islamic law. These processes have formed, and are to form, the key-notes of real progress in the system of law for an Islamic State, nay, for mankind as a whole. For these two practices have ipso facto recognized the vital importance of human reasoning. But since human reasoning, divorced from the principles of faith and trust, does not lead to the desired goal, it should be properly related with the eternal principles revealed in the Qur'ân. Otherwise, human reasoning is only likely to produce philosophical anarchism, speculative sectarianism and legal illegalism. To base law on undiluted human reasoning is but a deliberate planning for pushing the social system permanently away from the desired equilibrium. Keeping the basis intact, there should, however, be scope for rational enquiry into law and its interpretations. Needless to say, scientific inquiry into law was long established by learned doctors led by Abu Hanifa; and since then the Hanafi attitude has been playing a dominant role. One learned doctor has very correctly remarked:

"By far the greatest portion of Muslim law is the outcome of true inquiry; for the actual passages of the Qur'ân and the Sunnah have not contributed even a hundredth part to it."11

This tendency of rationalization is but natural, and the uncertainty factor involved, particularly in discriminating between different types of traditions of varying degrees of reliability, has got to be met by ijtihad (or application of reasoning), which the Prophet himself preferred. "The very basis of the third process of law, that of Ijma', is said to be the Prophet's saying that the community of people (or their representatives) cannot agree on going astray, or on an error. A further tradition states that the Prophet, while sending Mu'adhdhin for collection and distribution of the poor tax, asked him: "O Mu'adhdhin, by what rule will you act?" By the law of the Qur'ân," was the reply. He asked again: "If you find no direction therein?" Then I will act according to the Sunnah," replied Mu'adhdhin. "But even if that fails?" questioned the Prophet. "Then I shall make an ijtihad and act on that," was the reply. On this the Prophet was satisfied, and prayed to God by way of gratitude.12

Evidently our seventh fundamental principle of mutual consultation can appropriately guide even the present world to evolve a sound system of law. For it implies the sovereignty of the people in all spheres. But the exercise of sovereignty is to be guided by the nine keys. An Islamic State is thus characterized by legal, political or popular sovereignty, understood in the sense hinted above, and its prerequisite consists of balanced knowledge as stressed by the fifth fundamental principle.

Part to be played by education

This leads to the importance of a proper system of education in which not merely modern sciences and arts with the peculiar Western outlook should be imparted, but such studies and researches should be properly integrated with the immutable doctrines of Islam. Mere mundane knowledge might enable a man to fly to the moon or to Mars in jet planes, but in itself it is simply unable to lead his spirit pari passu to the universe of God. An Islamic State necessarily demands a re-planning of education on the lines of the nine fundamental principles already referred to. "In a ceaselessly changing world, man seeks a changeless pole" and "O thou who changest not, abide with me!" are regarded as the unconscious cries of humanity. Modern sciences have failed to supply a changeless pole, rather they have moved humanity farther and farther away from "the pole". When education and knowledge are tied together with the "changeless pole", the contact of the rope, however long or short it may be, will give man the consciousness of the pole. It is then that man's tremendous powers of knowledge can be used rightly and the real welfare of humanity can result from such use of the knowledge. The new planning of education suitable for an Islamic State, therefore, presupposes new researches to bring modern knowledge into proper relationship with faith and trust in God. In short, really progressive knowledge, which does not leave aside any part of human life vis-à-vis its goal, should be the aim of a balanced system of education; that is what has been postulated in an Islamic State. Masters of such knowledge will have the "know how" of new planning and new interpretations.

The wrong emphasis on knowledge for progressive material power has made the system of Western education unequal to its real objective. A Muslim educated in the right way may be more progressive than, or at least as progressive as, a perfect Westerner; but he will have something else. He will know the "secrets of his self" better than anybody else, and will be able to utilize the powers, myriad-winged in nature, arising out of such knowledge. He will thus realize development of himself to exclaim in an ecstatic joy:

"Venus I hold in thrall; the pearly moon
Doth worship me; and Reason's own great self
To master and control the world, I forged.
Deep down within the solid earth I went,
And thence shot up with wingéd speed until
The azure lay beneath my flaming feet.
A carpet rich and velvet-smooth to tread.
Sand-grains and the elfgut sun himself
Obey me as the genii the magician" (Iqbal).

But he is not power-drunk: for he is not forgetful of his source of power. Those who want to bring in the millennium through the keyhole of human reasoning alone should listen to the subtle hints of a Western educationist:

"A measure of the folly of the world is gauged when we realize that it need not require religion or morality to reform it; reason alone, if reason were powerful, could do all that is necessary to make of the earth a paradise for us all. Human reason alone, however, in fact is weak and becomes the prey of one or the other of the less noble passions. The urgent need is for the education of noble sentiment to put spurs to reason and force her to mend her pace."13

To conclude, in a word, "one umma, one State" is an ideal, and above all, a realizable ideal. "One world" is only one more step from that. Islamic planning, if at all, should aim at the realization of the ideal, in stages, in the imaginable future. Strivings in the Muslim world should but promote the process of progressive approximation to that politico-economic realization.

11 Nawawi, p. 237, as quoted by Khuda Bukhsh, supra, p. 408, footnote.
12 Klein, Religion of Islam, p. 51.
13 "Education in Pakistan," by Professor J. S. Turner, of the Dacca University. (Published in a series of articles in the Pakistan Observer for 7th October 1951.)
OBJECTIVITY AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY

The Conceptions of History by Al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun, Dr. Iqbal and other Muslim Historians

By HUSSEIN ALATAS

"The problem therefore lies not so much in history and in our ways of reasoning but in our very conception of life. The clashing views of history and objectivity in our present age reflect a similar happening in our conceptions of life. In the attempt to solve these problems our historical and intellectual horizons ought to be extended to the whole world and not to any particular spot, as was the case with those who suggested the solution based on the experience of Europe only. Sociology and social psychology have made this move, and it is to be hoped that the philosophy and the science of history will follow suit. Mankind is neither a class, nor a race, nor a culture, nor a religion, nor a belief. It is a whole which we have not yet understood, and on the complete or incomplete understanding of which depends the future of humanity."

Al-Ghazali introduced a new era in the historical development of objectivity

The crises and confusion in the world of thought that characterized the nineteenth century resulting from the philosophical inquiry into the nature and meaning of mind, matter and life, had centred itself around the question, "What constitutes objective knowledge?" Since time immemorial, the attention of mankind has been drawn towards this problem. But this does not mean that the problem of objective knowledge today is similar to that of bygone ages. A new era in the historical development of objectivity was introduced by the Muslim philosopher and jurist al-Ghazali (d. 1111 C.E.) when searching for an unshakable foundation for his belief. Al-Ghazali pointed out that philosophers had been disputing with one another about their respective systems based on empirical and rational certainty. He formulated the problem in another way. The problem, as al-Ghazali put it, was not to be certain of our belief but first to be certain of what certainty is. Before we can say that a certain knowledge is convincing and provable, that it makes us certain of what we have thus known, we ought to find out what we mean by certainty. In other words, before we regard any knowledge to be objective, we ought to know what we mean by the word objective, and what really constitutes objectivity. Today people do not distinguish any longer between objective and unobjective history, but between what is objectivity and what is history.

Ibn Khaldun's attempt to give an objective account of history

History, as it was conceived and written before, had merely been a compilation of recorded events selected at random or at the instigation of the writer's interest and preferences. In the fourteenth century, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, the Muslim historian of North Africa (1332-1406), wrote his monumental 'Universal History', in which he simultaneously laid down the principles of modern sociology. He conceived history not as a mere succession of events but as a process resulting from the operation of certain laws in human society. This idea of history as a process was first introduced by Hegel, as far as Europe is concerned. The subject matter of Ibn Khaldun's 'Universal History' is "the record of human society of world civilization, the changes that take place in the nature of that society, such as savagery, sociability, and group solidarity; of revolutions and uprisings by one set of people against another, with the resulting kingdoms and States, with their various ranks; of the different activities and occupations of men, whether for gaining their livelihood or in the various sciences and crafts; and, in general, of all the transformation that society undergoes by its very nature." We are here not so much interested in the subject matter of his history and the meaning he attached to it, or in the laws that he discovered operating in human society, but in his attempt to give an objective account of history.

Ibn Khaldun enumerated seven principal sources of error in the writing and recording of history. He wrote:

"The first of these is partisanship towards a creed or opinion. For when the mind receives in a state of neutrality and moderation any piece of information, it gives to that information its due share of investigation and criticism, so as to discharge the truth it contains from the errors; should the mind, however, be biased in favour of an opinion or creed, it at once accepts every favourable piece of information concerning this opinion. Therefore, partisanship acts as a blinker to the mind, preventing it from investigating and criticizing and inclining it to the reception and transmission of error."

The second factor is over-confidence in our materials and their sources. The third is failure to understand what is intended. The fourth is a mistaken belief in the truth. The fifth is "the inability rightly to place an event in its real context, owing to the complexity and obscurity of the situation. The sixth is the desire to gain favour and social approval. The seventh cause of error," continued Ibn Khaldun, "and the most important of all, is the ignorance of the laws governing the transformation of human society. For every single thing, whether it is an object or an action, is subject to a law governing its nature and any change that may take place in it. If, therefore, the historian understands the nature of events and changes that occur in the world, and the conditions governing them, such knowledge will help him more than anything else to clarify any record and to distinguish the truth it contains from the falsehoods." 

Modern attempts at objective account of history

Ever since the time of Ibn Khaldun, more factors that affect objectivity in the writing of history have been brought to light. Scientific researches have indicated that still more factors will be discovered. Thus the concept of objectivity is also subject to change in the same manner as the subject about which it tries to give an objective account and also subject to change. The Dutch historian Jan Romein enumerated among the factors which affected objectivity, the class, the environment and the age to which the historian is related. He also mentioned some highly important factors which are generally considered as the central problems of epistemology and philosophy. They are what Karl Mannheim classified as the "collective unconscious", or the irrational and

2 ibid.
3 Ibid.
Emotional drive in human thinking that draws people to pursue one way of conceiving life or another. Our mind, the mould by which the infinite quantity and quality of historical facts are shaped into an intelligible and interpretative process of events, is also not free from the influence of this irrational motivation. I shall attempt to present the solution of the problem of objectivity which has been given by some historians and see what we can make of it. But, before that, let us find out what people mean by history.

The meaning of history

It is, of course, generally accepted that our conception of history is also influenced by our conception of objectivity. Ibn Khaldun's history left no room for the improbable and the impossible such as the legend about Alexander the Great descending in a glass case to the bottom of the sea to make pictures of certain sea monsters which were preventing him from building the ports of Alexandria. This legend was recorded and believed by the chronicler Mas'udi, whose conception of objectivity differed from that of Ibn Khaldun in the sense that it was less scientific and thereby provided another view of history. For analytical purposes let us set aside the influential factors interacting between our conception of history and objectivity.

In the first place, all conceptions of history, like all conceptions of objects of phenomena, are abstractions of the human mind. To cite an instance, let us make an analogy between history and water. Our knowledge about water should be infinite. We can know about water from the chemical and physical points of view, but these two are not the only ones. The properties of water, such as the capacity to quench our thirst, to wet our hands, to erode soils, to produce sound, are infinite in number. Thus we can conceive water from many points of view but never totally and wholly. So it is with history. In his discussion with the Dutch historian Pieter Geyl, being aware of the nature of history, Arnold Toynbee made it plain that his Study of History was one of those shots in the dark. He wrote:

"I should never dream of claiming that my particular interpretation is the only one possible. There are, I am sure, many different alternative ways of analysing history, each of which is true in itself and illuminating, as far as it goes, just as, in dissecting an organism you throw light on its nature by laying bare either the skeleton or the muscles or the nerves or the circulation of the blood. No single one of these dissections tells the whole truth, but each of them reveals a genuine facet of it."

We can write about the historical process with religion, science, philosophy as our main subjects selected from the total and infinite historical reality. Besides this, to each selected subject we can give different and sometimes contradictory meanings and interpretations. Thus history is just like a river flowing in many directions and containing different elements. The historians are those who have harnessed the banks, each with a bucket in his hands. The buckets are of various shapes and sizes but the water they fetch is sometimes muddy and sometimes clear, depending on the various circumstances connected with the river. Sometimes the bucket itself is not clean, thus making pure water dirty. The historians then hurry back and vie with one another to sell the water poured into different bottles and with different labels.

It is thus clear to us that the historical reality can give us many possible interpretations of history. A lucid example of this was the fall of Rome and the Renaissance. Historians had not agreed to the cause of Rome's decline and to the significance of the Renaissance. Each historian advocated a different view supported by a mass of evidence equally refutable by their opponents.

The conceptions of history by Al-Ghazzali, Ibn Khaldun, Dr. Iqbal, and other modern historians

Arnold Toynbee conceived history as the development of religious systems with the basic law of change and response. Muhammad Iqbal thought of history as men's efforts to transform themselves into more or less perfect individuals in whom thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. The aims of these individuals in life are the continuous creation of desires and ideals based on the unity of God and mankind. Karl Marx viewed history to be the struggle between different classes centering on their modes of obtaining a livelihood. Benedetto Croce believed history as the act to comprehend and understand the requirements of practical life in the moral, aesthetic, political, scientific and other spheres of activity.

It may then be asked, why have we not agreed what history is? Knowing that a continuous dissonance in regard to such a fundamental aspect of our life as a conception of history is not natural and desirable, yet we persist in it. Is the difficulty inherent in itself or is it our error in giving history its wrong meaning or our adapting a wrong manner of approach? To answer these questions we must consider two highly important factors connected with them. In the first place no conception of history can exist independent of and isolated from our conception of life in general. Thus the interdependence of belief and the conception of history is established. In the second place, owing to this interdependence, a conflict between diverging systems of life in a given time and place will produce a similar result in the way history is regarded by those who live in that particular time and place. Bearing these factors in mind, let us now attempt to answer the above question.

The truth is that the problem lies not in the inherent difficulty of formulating a true conception of history but in the quest of the true system of life. In other words, the solution to the crisis in our conception of history lies not in the technique and method of writing history, i.e., the concepts and methodology employed, but in the discovery of a generally accepted system of life which is based not on the experience of a particular race, country or class but of mankind as a whole. Every attempt to formulate a philosophy of history will not be rewarded with success unless the intellectual and ideological background of which it is an inseparable part is first strongly and concretely established.

There is a tendency among historians to separate the writing of history from its intellectual and evaluative framework. They follow the habits of scientists in dissecting and analysing human experience into scattered bits and compartments. Such an attempt will not contribute to solving our problem. It only reveals to us the phenomenon that lies deep in the substratum of our intellectual and emotional turbulence, the desire to find relief by avoiding the real problem.

The problem of objectivity

Let us now return to the problem of objectivity. The word objectivity contains several factors and aspects. These can be divided into two parts for the purposes of analysis. They are the technique and method on one side and the values and attitudes on the other. By technique and method I mean the conceptual tools and principles of reasoning which are employed to account for historical facts devoid of value.

4 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia.
5 Pieter Geyl and Arnold Toynbee, Can We Determine the Pattern of the Past? p. 29.
judgments. They are meant to prevent logical errors and inconsistencies. This technique and method does not exclusively belong to one or two historians but is the common property of all. For example, the conceptual tools and method of reasoning employed in the theory of evolution could be used by different biologists to ascertain their various and sometimes contradictory conclusions. The other side of objectivity is the attitudes and values. Every concept of objectivity implies a criterion on which it is based. It is thus a concept consisting of certain relations. In other words, when we say something is objective, we mean that it is objective in comparison with certain values and ideas which we have accepted as a standard. Some historians, when dealing with the problem of objectivity, include only the technique and method as the subject matter. They avoid the affective and evaluative side of objectivity. I shall explain this further by citing as an example Professor Romein's interpretation of objectivity. Objective history, in the eyes of Professor Romein, is to understand and to comply with the requirements generated by the spirit of the age, that is, the most dominant force operating in it. This compliance with, and understanding of, the spirit of the time means taking into consideration the socio-historical unit as a whole and by siding with the dominant force. To take sides with this force Professor Romein considered as one step forward towards objectivity. He wrote:

"Precisely, his choosing a party makes him impartial because it makes it possible for him to understand the spirit of the time as a unified whole and thus leading him to understand the past, that is, to have an objective picture of it, that is, to have the certainty of it." 6

The party which he had chosen is that of the peasants and labourers, for they represent the force of the present. "For my part I have made the choice. I see the true spirit of the present in the emancipation struggle of the labourers and peasants, and as long as it exists, the critical form of knowledge connected with it is for me the dialectic-materialist one. To my mind, it reveals to us the greatest possible degree of objective knowledge concerning the past."

Professor Romein separated here the values and attitude which determined his choice from the conceptual and the methodological apparatus, which he inserted into or derived from dialectical materialism. That his conception of history did not represent an advance in the problem of objectivity can be clearly shown. To comply with and to understand the spirit of the time, does that really mean to be objective? It is definitely certain that without taking into account the spirit of the time and its basic forces, one cannot hope to understand history. But to base objectivity merely by associating it with the spirit of the time is nothing more than degrading the concept itself, for by this we exclude the other factors in objectivity, which are above any spirit or any time. I shall make this point clear. In 1649, a party called the Diggers came into being in England representing the exploited class. As a result of the dissension between themselves and Cromwell, a book was written by Gerard Dinsteinley in 1652 exposing the views and aspirations of the Diggers. Gerard Winstanley desired a kind of Communnistic social order based on non-sectarian and non-theocratic Christian belief. True freedom, as he saw it, should be that all could have equal access to the earth and its produce. This also meant economic equality. Without this there would be no equality because wealth gave power and power meant the ability to oppress. The views and desires of Gerard Winstanley neither complied with nor understood the spirit of the time, which was then feudalistic and precapitalistic. But these same views and desires contained a lot of truth and manifestation of positive justice. Thus there existed a separation between truth and justice on the one hand and the force which represented the spirit of the time on the other. To put it plainly, the force that dominated the socio-historical unit was not always the carrier of truth and justice. This was the case with feudalism and bourgeois capitalism. For this very reason a conception of objectivity cannot be correlated with either capitalism or feudalism. The same thing applies to the emancipation of peasants and labourers which Professor Romein called the force of the time. If this emancipation does not in itself carry the essentials of truth and positive justice, Professor Romein would certainly not correlate his conception of objectivity with it in the same manner that he did not correlate objectivity with feudalism and capitalism. This proves that the part of objectivity which has something to do with truth and justice is above any spirit of any time. It is an indispensable element in our conception of objectivity which is not touched by the force to which many historians like Professor Romein have tried to correlate it. The force of the time can only prevent or assist in the realization of these truths and justice. The main indictment of Marxism against capitalism is that capitalism failed to comply with the requirements of positive justice. Marxism claimed for itself the honour of being the new and decisive force in the historical process. Professor Romein shared the Marxist belief, with much truth, that the most important and significant force is the proletariat and the peasantry. The process of change induced by the new force also made use of certain principles of truth and justice which had long existed. This process is still happening. Since this process is not yet complete, it would then be logical to wait first before pronouncing our judgment. We could never correctly have pronounced our judgment on the feudalistic order before it had passed away from the historical scene. The same thing applies to the capitalist order. Is it not, then, reasonable to adopt the same attitude towards the order of the proletariat and the peasantry? If so, why then, we may ask, did Professor Romein correlate objectivity with a process, the process of emancipation, which had not yet been completed? The answer to this is that he excluded that indispensable and absolute element dealing with truth and justice from his conception of objectivity. Only if we exclude these elements can we manage to correlate objectivity merely with a process, or laws of historical development, such as the struggle for emancipation, as is the general habit of historical materialists. This would only lead us, as the above views of Professor Romein have revealed, either to historical relativism, which can never be rationally founded, or to permanent scepticism, which is an impossibility, or to an exclusion of value judgments above time and space, which means avoiding the core of the whole problem. By burying its head in the sand, the ostrich does not solve its problem.

Conclusion

The above analysis has made it clear that our concept of objective history has never been and never can be separated from what Mannheim called "the irreducible residue of human valuation". This valuation, in turn, constitutes an inseparable and indispensable part of our conception of life. It may be organized into a system or it may not to be so, but the fact remains that it is a conception of life which we cannot exclude from our views of objectivity and

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6 J. Romein, In opdracht van de tijd. Article: "Zekerheid en onzekerheid in de geschiedwetenschap."
history. It is in fact a component part of it. The problem therefore lies not so much in history and in our ways of reasoning but in our very conception of life. The clashing views of history and objectivity in our present age reflect a similar happening in our conceptions of life. In the attempt to solve these problems our historical and intellectual horizons ought to be extended to the whole world and not to any particular spot, as was the case with those who suggested the solution based on the experience of Europe only. Sociology and social psychology have made this move and it is to be hoped that the philosophy and the science of history will follow suit. Mankind is neither a class, nor a race, nor a culture, nor a religion, nor a belief. It is a whole which we have not yet understood, and on the complete or incomplete understanding of which depends the future of humanity.

THE POLITICAL SCENE IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM . . . . .

THE MASSACRE OF QIBYA AND THE MENACE OF ZIONISM

By ‘ABU MUHAMMAD

The shock of the Qibya massacre may galvanize the Arabs

I am only being frank when I say that I was, in a way, glad to learn that Israeli troops had massacred mercilessly sixty-six Arab men, women and children in the village of Qibya in Jordan in October 1953. My pleasure at the happening of this despicable event did not spring from any peculiar joy at seeing innocent Arab lives destroyed by Zionist terror, nor because I like humble Arab villages to be razed to the ground. I was pleased only because I hoped that the shock of this terrible massacre would be felt deeply in the whole world, and especially in the Arab world. I hoped that Arab politicians would at last realize the grave menace of Zionism and would take some serious and effective steps to halt this Zionist depredation and to prevent further Zionist aggression. If the Qibya incident succeeds in doing this, then I believe that the innocent men, women and children who died there will not have died in vain. By their death they would have secured life for many others who were otherwise destined, sooner or later, to meet the same miserable fate.

It is not the first time that Israel and her people have committed serious acts of terror and aggression against the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. As far back as 1948, the Jews have been committing mean acts of terrorism against the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. On 16th April 1948 — before the British mandate in Palestine ended on 15th May — the Jewish terrorist organization, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, massacred almost 250 Arab women and children in the village of Deir Yassin. By this and other similar acts of repression the Jews put 875,000 Arabs to flight from their homes (these are the official figures published by the United Nations). And since the State of Israel came into existence the Israeli authorities have perverted their laws in order to afford cover for official acts of unbridled persecution against the few thousand Arabs who remained in Israel, such as confiscating Arab agricultural land for “development” and razing whole villages for allegedly strategic reasons. From time to time there have also been acts of aggression by Israeli troops against Arab territory bordering on Israel. And there seems to be no reason to doubt that Israel will persist in such a policy in the future on an even greater scale, unless the Arab States do something to stop her.

It is for this reason that I say: “Let the Zionists insult us more, and let them massacre more innocent Arabs!” I shall not complain if by this they can at least awaken Arab statesmen from their deep slumber and make them realize fully what Zionism means. The Zionists know their enemy quite well. When Israel fearlessly broadcast on her radio that the massacre of Qibya was carried out as a “justifiable revenge” for the murder by Arab “infiltrators” from Jordan of three Jews in a neighbouring Jewish settlement, she adds insult to injury to the Arabs as a whole. It is because Israel has been accustomed to look upon Arab statesmen as impotent chatterboxes that she dares to treat the Arab world in this contemptuous manner. Israel challenged the Arab States to war in 1948, and she won that war. And the fate of Palestine was decided not so much by Zionist strength as by Arab weakness and dissipation. Can one, therefore, blame Israel if she now thinks that the Arabs who have accepted shameful defeat will accept yet another defeat and another provocative insult?

Why did the Israelis attack Qibya? How did the Arab
States face this hideous crime? And what was the reaction of the whole world to this development in Arab-Israeli relations?

**Israeli motives in perpetrating the massacre at Qibya**

Israel is under severe strain and stress. Her people are suffering acutely from the tight economic blockade by the Arab States which has almost stifled Israel and weakened her economy to a very great extent. Because of this blockade Israel has had to rely to a large extent on the charity of world Jewry and on the munificence of the United States of America. But how long will this succour from the outside world be forthcoming? Israeli statesmen are beginning to feel that the day will soon come when world Jewry and the United States of America will no longer be disposed to maintain Israel economically, and that Israel will then have to earn her bread by the sweat of her brow. This Israel will not be able to do unless the neighbouring Arab countries are opened to her as markets for her industrial products and as suppliers of food and cheap raw materials. And only a peace settlement between her and the Arab countries can make this possible.

Israel has, in her own peculiar way, made repeated efforts to secure “peace” with her neighbours. But her overtures have fallen on deaf ears as the Arab countries remain adamant in their hostility to her and continue to insist that an essential pre-requisite of any peace negotiations is the fulfilment by Israel of past resolutions of the United Nations, especially the resolution with regard to the repatriation of Palestinian Arab refugees who wish to return to their homes and the compensation of those who do not wish to return, and the resolution with regard to the evacuation by Israel of those parts of Palestine which were not allotted to her by the General Assembly’s partition plan. But Israel does not feel disposed to comply with either of these conditions. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, thousands of Jews have been brought into the country to occupy the lands and houses which were evacuated by the Arab refugees. As a result of this, Israel now feels that the territory under her control is far too small to accommodate her people comfortably, and it is an open secret that certain political parties in Israel and outside Israel advocate an expansionist policy which aims at annexing to Israel a large part of the Kingdom of Jordan which comprises the remaining part of the geographical area of Biblical Israel. Israeli statesmen hold the view that Jordan will fall an easy prey to them; for they consider it the weakest spot in the Arab edifice surrounding Jordan. Jordan, which lives mainly on British charity, and whose army is commanded by a Briton, seems to the outside world and to many Arabs as a British satellite governed more from London than from Amman. The people of Israel have longed for the occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem and of Solomon’s Temple (now in Jordan hands), and it will not be surprising if Israel springs an attack against the Old City of Jerusalem and occupies it before the Jordan Arab Legion wakes up from its deep hypnotic coma.

Israel has repeatedly expressed her willingness to negotiate a peace settlement with the Arab States — on the basis of Arab acceptance of the faits accomplis. And in the future, when Israel seizes more territory from the Arabs, Israel will also express her readiness to negotiate — again on the basis of Arab acceptance of the faits accomplis. This, of course, makes utter nonsense of “peace negotiations”. But the sad fact is that, as a result of perverted Zionist propaganda all over the world, the Arab States, by their refusal to be ensnared into the Zionist trap, are made to look to the outside world stubborn bloodthirsty warmongers. For this hostile view of Arab rights by the world we have to thank the benighted policy of the Arab States which neglects propaganda for the Arab cause outside the Arab world. Israel has achieved a great deal of active sympathy to her cause by vigilant propaganda. And the policy of forcing the Arabs to accept faits accomplis, however unjust they may be, and branding the Arabs as villains of the piece if they complain, has yielded good dividends to Israel in the past. It may still be profitable for Israel to adhere to this policy in the future, and the world, especially the Great Powers, can be relied upon to support her for various sinister motives.

By her attack on Qibya, Israel has sought, in her own perverted way, to draw the attention of the world to the need for a final peace settlement in Palestine. Israeli statesmen and newspapers glossed lightly over the moral aspect of this hideous massacre and took the view that it was the direct result of the technical existence of a state of war between Israel and her Arab neighbours. No such incidents would occur if there was peace between Israel and the Arab countries. Israel has thus sought to rally the Great Powers to her view and to get them to bring pressure to bear on the Arab countries to conclude a final peace settlement. The “peace” which Israel seeks is, as I have already said, peace on her own terms. Should such a peace settlement not require the Arabs to concede more of their rights, it would, at least, require them to accept the status quo as permanent. And, of course, such a peace settlement would provide for the lifting of the economic blockade of Israel by the Arab countries and would give Israel a new lease of life, without benefiting the Arabs in any way. By this peace settlement the Arabs would be strengthening their eternal enemy and providing them with weapons to inflict yet more grievous injury.

**An analysis of the Arab reaction to the Israeli massacre of Qibya**

The reaction of the Arabs to the Qibya massacre was prompt. They protested and their leaders made vociferous speeches, as usual. Delegates from the Arab countries were called by the Arab League to an emergency meeting in Amman. They deliberated in secret, and after the meeting there was a procession of Arab statesmen to Qibya to visit the ruins of this village and, perhaps, to say a prayer for the repose of the souls of the innocent victims. We were told by the Secretary-General of the Arab League that the resolutions adopted at this meeting were “practical resolutions which will ensure that Israel will not be able to get away again with any similar aggression against Jordan or any neighbouring Arab country”. Big words, these; but the Arab peoples, who have been incensed by this massacre, were not altogether satisfied with this declaration. They wanted actions, not words; for they had been treated to big-sounding resolutions ad nauseam. Did not the rulers and leading statesmen of the various Arab countries declare in solemn ceremony in 1947 that they would defend Palestine to the last man? Did not one notable Arab king say that he would “saturate the soil of Palestine with the blood of his sons before he would see it fall to the Jews”; and did not that Arab king send only a handful of soldiers to Palestine, none of whom saw any active fighting? Words will never deter Israel, for Israel, too, by her past experience, knows that the words of the Arab statesmen are rarely accompanied by actions.

Great emphasis was laid upon the resolution adopted at this meeting of the Arab League which recommended the establishment of a national guard in Jordan. This force
would be financed by the various Arab governments and would be charged with protecting the Jordan border from Israeli aggression. This national guard would not be under the control of Brigadier Glubb, the commander of the Jordan Arab Legion, and this decision to make it independent of indirect control by Britain may allay anxiety in the minds of the Arab peoples about its possible subservience to Britain. A national guard of this type may be quite useful, and it is a great pity that the Arab statesmen had not thought of such a plan long ago, for it seems a simple and logical answer to the Israeli menace to the Jordan frontier villages. But money is needed to finance this force, and the Arab States have made vague promises about providing this money from their national treasuries. Will these promises be kept?

The Arab States, and particularly those which had become rich as a result of immense oil royalties, have shown little financial sympathy with the economic and financial plight of their less affluent sisters. Arab States like Jordan and Libya have had to seek financial aid from the Western world, and to barter their national aims and aspirations in the bargain. But let us be optimistic this time and hope that the promises now made by the Arab States to help finance the Jordan national guard will be kept. And let us pray that the Arab statesmen will not be tempted to sacrifice yet another part of the Arab world on the altar of Zionism for the sake of a few thousand pounds. Again, let us all pray that there will be no evil and disastrous strife amongst the Arab States as to who will have command of this national guard.

What the governments of Arab countries should do to face the menace of Israel

There are hopeful signs of a drastic change in feeling in the Arab countries over the aims of Zionism. Apart from the sense of acute revulsion which the Qibya massacre has created in the minds of the Arab peoples as a whole, there is a growing sense of impatience at the fruitless endeavours of the Arab statesmen to prevent repeated insults being directed by Israel against the whole Arab world. The governments of the Arab countries must adopt a positive and realistic policy towards the Zionist challenge if they are to survive the mounting exasperation and impatience amongst the Arab masses. It may be recalled that the murder of King Abdullah of Jordan in 1951 was the direct result of his reputed failure to oppose Zionism with all his strength, and that the coup d'état which occurred in Syria, the Lebanon and Egypt during the last two years were not entirely unconnected with the defeat of the Arabs at the hands of Israel, and with the sense of revulsion and discontent created in the minds of the Arab peoples by the exposition of the weakness and discord in their national edifice promoted by corrupt and spiritless politicians. The Arab statesmen must reassure their peoples if they are to stem the mounting impatience at what is nothing but dejected pacifism on the part of the Arab governments.

The reaction of world opinion to the massacre of Qibya and the extent of the influence of Zionism outside Israel

How did world opinion react to the Qibya incident? Britain, the United States of America and France (the signatories of the declaration guaranteeing the status quo in Palestine) sent a protest to the Israel Government strongly condemning the massacre of Qibya. An emergency meeting of the Security Council was called, and the head of the United Nations Commission for the supervision of the truce in Palestine, General Bennike, was called upon to report to the Security Council on this incident. When General Bennike reported to the Security Council he had this to say:

“United Nations observers fully confirmed that it was the work of Israeli military detachments and not of civilians as persistently stated in Tel Aviv. United Nations deduced from the bullet-ridden bodies near doorways and multiple hits on the doors of demolished houses that the inhabitants had been forced to remain inside until their homes were blown up over them.”

Apart from this official condemnation on the part of the three Great Powers, the world Press was rather half-hearted in its judgment on the Israeli action. Many toed the Israeli line when they advocated a peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel. Although there were no specific proposals as to the terms of such a settlement, it was evident that it was not thought worthwhile by the world Press in general, and by the Press in the United States of America, Britain and France in particular, to advocate a peace settlement on the basis of the old and unfulfilled resolutions of the United Nations which has been flagrantly disregarded by Israel. The magic of the fait accompli seems to have charmed the whole world, and not one of the Great Powers seem to have the courage to coerce Israel into obeying the United Nations resolutions which were in favour of the Arabs. Perhaps the reason for this is that the Arabs have sunk very low in the estimation of the world; so low that no influential Power seems to bother to recognize their rights. Somehow, Israel can always manage to make herself important to the Great Powers and get them to woo her by furthering her aims against the Arabs.

The power of Zionism outside Israel and her influence on the three Great Powers, and particularly the United States of America, was felt when these Powers attempted to put their condemnation into effect by getting a resolution passed by the Security Council strongly censuring Israel for the Qibya massacre. President Eisenhower, whose Republican party is known to be not so closely wedded to Zionism as the Democratic party, decided to stop American aid to Israel as long as Israel continued to defy the Palestine truce agreement by diverting the waters of the Jordan on the Syrian border. No sooner did the American State Department announce this decision than the Israeli Government declared that it had stopped work on its scheme for the diversion of the waters of the Jordan river. And President Eisenhower forthwith, and without getting any confirmation from the United Nations observers in Palestine on Israel's allegation, decided to resume aid to her. Later, when it came to proposing formally a vote of censure against Israel in the Security Council for the Qibya incident, the American delegate was far from forthright and asked for a postponement of the Council's debate. The reason for the American request was quite obvious. There was a Mayoral election in New York, and this election was hotly contested by both the Democratic and Republican parties. Any action by the Republican party in opposition to Israel, irrespective of the moral or conscientious grounds for such action, would have brought the wrath of the large Jewish electorate in New York on it and would have lessened its chances of winning this election. The Republican party, not unlike its predecessor, the Democratic party, had no scruples about compromising its conscience in order to curry favour with the Jewish voters in New York. It may be recalled that the United Nations resolution in 1947 for the partition of Palestine was zealously sponsored by the Democratic Government of the United States in order to win the support of the influential Jewish electorate in the country, and it is no exaggeration to say that the fate of Palestine was sealed by the all-powerful Zionists in the United States of America who, through the United States Government, coerced and bribed by Marshall

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aid poor and backward nations into voting for the partition plan in the United Nations Assembly. The Republican party candidate in the municipal election in New York did not succeed, and political observers have attributed his failure partly to the fact that President Eisenhower's administration had alienated Jewish sympathies in New York by its expression of displeasure at Israel's recent actions in Palestine.

How Zionism works

That world Zionism wields such aggressive power, and that the Zionists can, at their whims and fancies and by "remote control" manoeuvre influential governments like the United States of America as if they were puppets in a marionette show, is a known fact the truth of which has been demonstrated over and over again in modern history. As far back as 1870, the French Government was bribed into favouring Jews living in Algeria (which was conquered by the French in 1930) by making them fully-fledged French citizens while the Arabs were technically servile subjects. The French Government at that time was in need of a loan to pay its war debt to the Germans, and the Rothschilds (the famous Jewish family of immense fortune) were prepared to provide the loan only if the French Government would grant French citizenship to the Algerian Jews. Another notable example of the behind-the-scenes activities of Zionism was the giving of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government on 2nd November 1917, by which the British Government promised to facilitate the setting up of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This declaration was to reward Dr. Chaim Weizmann (first President of Israel; d. 1953) for his scientific discoveries which helped the British war effort in World War I. And there have been many other examples of a similar nature. It is a terrifying thought!

It was certain that the Security Council would eventually pass a resolution censuring Israel for her aggression in Qibya, although it was feared that the force and effectiveness of this censure would be diluted by the linking of this specific issue with extraneous matters such as requests to the Arab States to negotiate an early peace with Israel. The Arabs will never negotiate a peace with Israel except on the basis of the previous unfulfilled resolutions of the United Nations — namely, the resolution calling upon Israel to allow the Arab refugees to return to their homes and retrieve their property and to compensate those who do not wish to return, the resolution for the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the resolution for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territory which was allotted to the Arabs in the partition scheme. Israel, however, will never accept such terms unless economic and political pressure is exerted upon her by the Great Powers, particularly the United States of America.

There seems to be, therefore, little prospect of an early peace settlement in Palestine. Israel wants to "negotiate" with the Arabs. So the initiative now lies with the Arabs. If and when these negotiations take place the Arabs must negotiate with Israel in the only language she understands — force. Only in this way can there be "peace with honour" for the Arabs that would bring calm to the troubled waters of the Middle East.

THE SANUSIYYAH FRATERNITY

The Sanusiyyah Fraternity in Islam is designated as the Sanusiyyah-Idrisiyya because of its connection with the Sayyid Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi (d. 1859 C.E.) and the Sayyid Ahmad Ibn Idris (d. 1831 C.E.; like the Qadiriyah, the Nasiriyah and the Shadziliyyah Movements — the Qadiriyah because of its connection with the Sayyid ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani (d. 1166 C.E.), the Nasiriyah because of its connection with the Sayyid Muhammad Ibn Nasir of Morocco, and the Shadziliyyah because of its connection with the Sayyid ‘Ali Abu al-Hasan al-Shadzili (d. 1258 C.E.). The Sanusiyyah Movement is one of the Sufi groups in Islam. The Movement upholds nothing that has not been professed and taught by the leading Imams and Jurists of the early days of Islam. It follows strictly the doctrines embodied in the Qur’an and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.

The founder of the Sanusiyyah Movement is the Sayyid Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi (known as al-Sanusi al-Kabeer — the great Sanusi), who was born in the town of Mustaghanim in Algeria (the home of the tribe of al-Khattab) on 12 Rabi’ al-Awal, 1202 A.H. (1782 C.E.). His grandfather of the same name, was an eminent Imam who had made extensive tours of Arab North Africa. He was known as al-Sanusi because on one of his tours he had stayed at Talsamann (Tlemcen) in Algeria with a tribe known as the Bani Sanus.

The Sayyid Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi, the founder of the Sanusi Movement, began his career as a teacher of the Qur’an. He studied Islamic theology at Fas (Fes) and at the University of al-Qarawiyyin, Morocco. He went on frequent tours of various parts of North Africa, where he preached his religious doctrines and sought support for his Movement. He visited Mecca and Medina, where he stayed for some time studying Islamic theology, fiqh and Sufism. Not long after his return to Algeria the country was occupied by the French. This forced him to leave his home for Cairo, where he joined the University of al-Azhar. At al-Azhar, however, his teachings were not very well received, and his opponents made heavy weather for him. And so he left Cairo and went once again to Mecca.

In Mecca he met the Sayyid Ahmad Ibn Idris. The two found a great deal in common between them and joined hands in their religious activities. They made many joint visits to remote places in the heart of the Arabian peninsula and spent many years among the Bedouins of the Hedjaz, many of whom were converted to their movement. When the Sayyid Ahmad Ibn Idris died he had already expressed to his followers and supporters a wish that the Sayyid Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi should be appointed as his successor and leader of the Movement; and the Sayyid al-Sanusi was in due course elected as the leader of the Movement.

One of the aims of the Sayyid al-Sanusi's activities in Arabia was to bring about union between the Arabs in the Arabian peninsula and their brethren in North Africa. He pursued this aim zealously and assiduously. But his activities in this direction got him into trouble with the leaders and the Shaikhs of Mecca and ultimately forced him to leave the country. From the Hedjaz he went to Cyrenaica and stayed in the vicinity of the town of Benghazi. His followers and supporters increased progressively, and before long he had a very strong gathering around him.

The Movement started by the Sayyid al-Sanusi was founded on three things: the zawiyah (hostel), the ikhwan

1 Courtesy, the Editor, al-Muslim, Cairo, Egypt, for October 1953.
(brethren) and the wakeel (representative). The zawiyahs were usually built near a well or an oasis frequented by caravans of travellers; the ikhwan were the active members and workers in the Movement; and the wakeel was the official representative of the leader of the Movement and in charge of the administration of the affairs of the Movement in his particular district.

The Sayyid Muhammad al-Sanusi strove hard to bring about a revival of truly Islamic practices. He exhorted his followers to shun luxuries and to lead a simple and frugal existence. He preached against the use of gold and jewellery for the adornment of men, and prohibited the smoking of tobacco and the drinking of coffee. At no time did he strive to be a political leader or seek worldly power or position. He preached no new theological doctrines, and was mainly preoccupied with exhorting his followers to revert to the original teachings of Islam and adhere to the doctrines and practices which had made Islam great in its early days. Many zawiyahs were built during his life, and chief amongst these zawiyahs were those at the oases of Jaghboub (founded in 1837 C.E.), Siwah, Kufra, Jalu, Awjalah and the White Hostel (al-zawiyah al-baida). The Sanusi Movement found favour with the Bedouins in the deserts of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and its followers increased very quickly.

The Sayyid al-Sanusi spent the last six years of his life at the Zawiyah of Jaghboub, which he set up as his headquarters of the Movement and which soon established itself as one of the most renowned institutions of religious learning in that part of the world. He was recognized by his followers as a great saint, and his forceful and impressive personality enabled him to stem the unruly degradations of Bedouin tribes over a wide area of North Africa. This achievement is perhaps not the least significant of his many great achievements.

The Sayyid al-Sanusi died on Wednesday 9 Safir 1276 A.H. (1859 C.E.), at the age of 74. He was buried at the Zawiyah of Jaghboub.

The following are some of the many important treatises on theology and Sufism written by the Sayyid al-Sanusi: Baghiyyah al-Maqaasid wa Khulasat al-Maraasid, al-Salsabheel al-mu‘een, al-Durar al-saniyyah fi Akhbar al-Sulaalat al-idristiyyah.

THE FOUNDER OF MODERN ARABIA

The Late King ‘Abd al-‘Azeez al-Sa‘ud
(d. 9th NOVEMBER, 1953)

By “AN ARAB”

During the Pilgrimage season about two years ago there was displayed in Mecca and Medina, and other towns and villages of Sa‘udi Arabia, on all notice-boards in public places, a Royal Proclamation which read as follows:

“From ‘Abd al-‘Azeez Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Sa‘ud, to the people of the Arabian Peninsula: Any one of our subjects who feels that he is being oppressed must submit a complaint to us. And anyone who wishes to lay such a complaint before us must transmit it by telegram or post, at our expense and without paying any fee.

“All officials of the Posts and Telegraphs Department are hereby commanded to accept such letters or telegrams from our subjects for transmission to us free of charge, even though the complaint be against one of our children, grandchildren or any other members of my family. And be it known to every official who might endeavour to induce any one of our subjects not to proceed with his complaint as aforesaid, whatever be the substance or merit of such complaint, or who might attempt to prevail upon such complaint to mitigate the tone of his complaint, that we shall impose upon him severe punishment.

“It is my intention never in my life to allow any person to be oppressed, and I ask the Almighty not to exact upon me punishment for countenancing such oppression against anyone, or for not giving succour to the oppressed, or for not restoring a usurped right. . . .

“I have given warning. May God be my witness.”

This notice had more than one sequence. Soon after it appeared, King ‘Abd al-‘Azeez was proceeding slowly in his car along one of the main thoroughfares of Riyadh. He was on one of his many “Processions of Mercy”. Dense crowds gathered by the roadside. The King was throwing to the crowds silver riyals from fat bags which he carried with him. The coins were picked up by the crowds, and there were cries of, “May God bless you, O ‘Abd al-‘Azeez!” Suddenly a man rushed from amongst the crowd to the King’s car and shouted, “I am oppressed, O ‘Abd al-‘Azeez . . . I am oppressed!” The King ordered his car to stop and asked the man what he wanted. “I want to emigrate, I want medicine, and I want clothes.” “Give the man twenty riyals,” the King said to one of his attendants. And the “Procession of Mercy” proceeded.

A few days after this incident, the King presided over a public meeting of his elder statesmen. The elaborate meeting had been convened for the express purpose of considering a complaint lodged by a humble Sa‘udi Arabian subject against one of the King’s sons. The complainant had been
asked to plead his case in person before the King in Council, and was brought over by special plane to attend this meeting. The complainant stood up before the King, and the King, after making a few opening remarks in which he requested the complainant to speak up frankly and without fear, asked the man for particulars of his complaint. "I own a piece of land in Jeddah," the man said, "and on my return from a visit to Egypt I found that one of your sons, Prince ——, had usurped a few metres of my land and added it to his adjoining land, and he built himself a large house on this land." Prince —— was summoned. The King then asked the complainant to repeat his complaint, and turned to Prince —— and said to him, "Defend yourself!" The Prince said, "I was in Europe when this happened. The building contractor was responsible for this mistake. I had no knowledge of the exact boundary of my land. What took place was not the product of any fraudulent or bad intention on my part. And I am willing and ready to fulfill your Majesty's command." The contractor was then summoned and examined by the King personally. Finally the King pronounced his verdict. "The complainant must be given the option of either having the land back, in which case the building must be demolished, or of accepting as compensation for its loss a sum of money equal to four times its market price, to be paid by our son," the King said. The man said that he would accept the payment of compensation. The money was paid forthwith, and the case was closed.

This was King 'Abd al-'Azeez Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa'ud, the central figure in the "Procession of Mercy", and King 'Abd al-'Azeez the judge. These two interesting anecdotes are typical of the manner in which this great man sought to bring justice and succour to the oppressed and needy amongst his subjects. To the social historian these rather naive methods seem to belong to an era long gone and not to the twentieth century. But whether they conform to the present-day outlook on government or not, one cannot but be inspired by them and hold in esteem the person of these qualities, especially when holding the sceptre of power.

The story of King 'Abd al-'Azeez's life is almost legendary. It is a story which abounds with the romantic thrill of battle, conquest, riches and glory, a story that in parts is stranger than fiction, and a story that will stand out for a long time to come as the most fascinating and glittering story in the annals of the twentieth century.

King 'Abd al-'Azeez commonly called King Ibn Sa'ud, King of the Hedjaz and Najd and its dependencies, was born at Riyadh in Arabia in December 1880. His father, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, was the youngest of four sons of Amir Faisal, who reigned over Najd from 1834 to 1867. On Faisal's death his two elder sons, 'Abdullah and Sa'ud, plunged the country into civil war, as a result of which al-Hasa was occupied by the Turks in 1875 and Riyadh by Ibn al-Rasheed in 1891. 'Abd al-Rahman went into exile to Kuwait, and from there in 1900 took the first step towards unseating the dynasty of Ibn al-Rasheed. This attempted invasion was defeated, and was followed in 1901 by an attempt on the part of his son, 'Abd al-'Azeez, who launched out into the desert on a desperate venture to regain his family's lost inheritance with a force of some 200 men. In January 1902, and with a force of 15 men, 'Abd al-'Azeez penetrated into Riyadh, and after killing the Governor of the town was pro-claimed ruler of Najd. In 1904 he defeated a Turkish force which was sent to help Ibn al-Rasheed and became ruler of al-Qaseem. Later, in 1912, he founded the first of the 'Ikhwan settlements, which became the nuclei of the Wahhabi Movement, of which he was the Imam and leader. Hundreds of these settlements sprang up in various parts of the desert during the next fifteen years. Each settlement had a mosque and a religious establishment subsidized by the State, and its members were engaged in agriculture and farming. The essential purpose of these settlements was the mixing of hitherto antagonistic tribal elements in common brotherhood. 'Ikhwan became members of 'Abd al-'Azeez's standing army, and helped him in his conquest of other parts of Arabia.

In 1924, 'Abd al-'Azeez advanced on the Hedjaz, which was then under the rule of al-Sharif Husain, of the Hashemite dynasty, and before the end of the following year he succeeded in ousting al-Sharif Husain and was proclaimed King of the Hedjaz and Najd.

In 1933 King 'Abd al-'Azeez granted a number of American companies concessions to prospect for oil in Arabia. Oil production began in 1946 with 2,600 tons, and has risen steadily to about 40,000,000 tons in 1952, bringing in a revenue of nearly £50,000,000 for the Sa'udi Arabian Government.

To King 'Abd al-'Azeez goes the credit of having established peace and order over a wide country of about 6,000,000 people which had long been troubled by disunity and incessant tribal warfare and banditry. Before King 'Abd al-'Azeez's reign, travel in Arabia was both hazardous and unsafe, but now banditry has been eradicated and law and order prevails over the whole country.

King 'Abd al-'Azeez bestowed many benefits upon his country as a result of the tremendous increase in its revenue from oil. He helped introduce modern inventions and techniques to many parts of the country. But many of the outlying districts of his kingdom remain as yet untouched and unaffected by this progress.

In the last days of his reign, King 'Abd al-'Azeez handed over most of the administration of the Government to his son, the Amir Sa'ud, who is now King, but his counsel remained the prime factor in the direction of the affairs of state.

The qualities that the late King brought to his illustrious rule were enormous strength, courage and vitality, a charming and magnetic personality, sound judgment, an ability on the one hand to forgive his enemies, and on the other hand to be harsh and even ruthless when the occasion demanded. But above all, the late King had a solid faith in Islam, the precepts of which were his guide and inspiration at all times.

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THE WOKING MUSLIM MISSION AND LITERARY TRUST
WOKING — SURREY — ENGLAND

JANUARY 1954
After the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement about the future of the Sudan at Cairo on the 14th February 1953, celebrations took place to mark this great event on the 20th February near the Mahdi's Tomb in Khartoum.

Our picture shows the Torch of Freedom being lit in front of an engineering workshop.

The words in Arabic read: “This National Flame cannot be put out”

THE SUDAN PARLIAMENT
Above centre — An aerial view of the Houses of Parliament of the Sudan at Khartoum. The building in the foreground is the House of the Senate, while the one behind is the House of Representatives.

The House of Representatives has 97 members, which is composed of the National Unionists 50, the Umma Party 23, The Socialist Republicans 3, the Southern Party 9, other parties 12, and Anti-Colonization Front 1.

The Senate has 50 members, of which 30 are elected and 20 nominated. In the recent elections the National Unionists won 21, the Umma Party 4, Independents 2 and other parties 3.

The Sayyid Sir 'Ali Mirghani, the leader of the Khatmis (Sufi) Fraternity, has always been a supporter of the National Struggle Front composed of various political parties which have won a clear majority in the recent elections. His support has contributed largely to the success of the National Unionists.
NATION IS BORN
IN THE SUDAN

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regarding the future of the Sudan was signed at Cairo on the 14th February 1953. As a result, celebrations were held by the Sudanese political parties near the Mahdi’s Tomb, Khartoum, on 20th February 1953. Our picture shows members of the Society for the Advancement of Women in the Sudan taking part in the celebrations.

The words in Arabic on the placard carried aloft read: “The Society for the Advancement of Women in the Sudan congratulates you and joins the Nation in its happiness on the occasion of the Festival of Independence.”

FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE SUDAN

Lower centre — The Sudan extends from the northern boundary of Egypt, 22° N. lat., to the northern boundary of Uganda, 3° 36′ lat., and reaches from French Equatorial Africa about 21° 49′ E. (at 12° 45′ N.) to the north-west boundary of Eritrea in 38° 25′ E. at 18° 0′ N.). The greatest length from north to south is approximately 1,300 miles, and from east to west 950 miles.

The estimated area is about 976,750 square miles with a population of about 8,766,000. The majority of the population is Muslim.

The leader of the National Unionists, Mr. Isma'il al-Azhari, who is expected to be the first Prime Minister of the Sudan.
THE SUDAN'S VERDICT ON ITS FUTURE

By G. H. NEVILLE-BAGOT

The Sudanese elections

The election of seventy-one National Unionists to the Sudan Parliament has completely shattered the claims of the so-called Independence Front that it alone represented the true aspirations of the Sudanese people. The Unionists, who expect to get the support of one Khatmia independent and the three Socialist Republicans, will control over half the seats in the Lower House called the House of Representatives. The Unionists have won twenty-one seats in the Upper House, called the Senate. The Unionists have a clear majority in the Lower House, which has 51 Unionists.

The results of these elections come as no surprise to informed supporters of the Sudanese people and of the Arab-Muslim world. But they have staggered the British Press.

Only a week before the results were out, the correspondent of the London Observer at Khartoum had written an optimistic report favouring the chances of the Umma Party. The British Press had almost without exception given a ridiculous importance to the supporters of the Ansar leader, Sayyid Sir 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, whose party has won only twenty-two seats. In fact last year there was a boycott of the Unionists' representative delegation that came to England. It received very little publicity, while an unknown Sudanese politician, a certain Mr. 'Umar, representing himself created a Sudan Party, advocating adherence to the British Commonwealth, managed to get his picture published in The Times, London, and The Manchester Guardian, together with an impressive interview which in view of the relative non-existence of his party reached astronomical proportions. The attitude of the British Press was taken by the Sudan nationalists as an indication of the immense power of the Sudan Government over the London Press. Although everybody was impressed by his intellect and technical qualifications and his complete mastery of the English language, Mr. Merghani Hamza spent a fortnight attempting to give the British a balanced view on the relative importance of the Sudan Unionists, but only The New Statesman and Nation and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, gave him a sympathetic audience. At the same time, Sayyid Sir 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and his 'Umma supporters were able to carry on an effective propaganda campaign from a London luxury hotel, although it was generally known that the Ansar supporters of al-Mahdi only numbered from 500,000 to 1,000,000, as against the supporters of the Unionist, Sayyid 'Ali Mirghani, the leader of the Khatmia, who numbered some 3,000,000. The Unionists also had the critical support of the 150,000 trade unionists and the 7,000 Civil Servants, as well as of the progressive non-sectarian

These are the seven Sudanese leaders who came to England in January 1953 to discuss with the British Foreign Minister the point of view of the National Struggle Front composed of various political parties who believe in some sort of union with Egypt and independence of Great Britain. From left to right they are: Muhammad Amin Husain, Yahya al-Fadil, Khidr 'Omar, Merghani Hamza, Dr. 'Aly Oro, Derdiri Ahmad Isma'il, and Mubarak Zarrour

Sudanese and the powerful widely-read left-wing paper, al-Saraha. But at Atbara, the trade unionists ran their own candidate, who was defeated by a Unionist.

On the whole, in spite of mutual recrimination accusations of British and Egyptian interference and local charges of bribery, the elections have taken place in a calm atmosphere which does the Sudanese great credit and shows their
growing political maturity. The difficulty of getting the Southerners to vote, in spite of the use of ingenious emblems, is most likely responsible for the poll of only 30 per cent. The Unionists won three out of twenty-two Southern seats as the result of a great deal of hard work. But it should be said that this was a considerable achievement. There is no doubt that the Unionist support will increase considerably in the South when the elections take place within three years in order to decide the Sudan's ultimate relations with Egypt.

The history of the Sudan's relations with Egypt and Britain

In *The Islamic Review* for January and December, 1952, I discussed the historic development of the Sudan and her relationship with Egypt and Britain. As the Egyptian one of the worst examples of British chauvinism only to be equalled by the Mafeking relief celebrations in the Boer War and the early years of the Great War. The Sudan was reconquered by a combined British and Egyptian force of 8,000 British and 17,000 Egyptians under Lord Kitchener. Egypt bore the brunt of the cost. According to the English squire and poet, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, who opposed the occupation of Egypt and saved 'Orabi's life, and who remained the lifelong friend of the Shaikh Muhammad 'Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, "the sending of British troops is not at all because they are needed, for our English regiments are inferior in every way to the Egyptian ones for such work, but to gratify the English Government, and especially the Queen, who considers the glory of her reign tarnished by the death of Gordon, and who wants to be avenged." The Khalifa of the Mahdi, 'Abdullahi, a tremendously strong personality, and the Sudanese general, Najumi, were killed in these campaigns: 'Uthman Digna was ultimately captured and a condominium declared establishing joint Anglo-Egyptian control in 1899. The British set up an elite administration of British officials. They first favoured the Khatmiya supporters of the Mirghani family, which had been persecuted by the Mahdists. Sir 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was then living on a tiny pension of a few Egyptian pounds per month. But later, when he became friendly with the British, he developed into a millionaire cotton grower and the established leader of the Ansar, or former Mahdists, whom British officialdom played off against the Khatmiya. The British also trained a small but efficient and courageous Sudanese Defence Corps, one of whose officers, Sayyid 'Abdullah Khalil, became a leader of the Ansar political party, the Umma.

The assassination of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces (the Sirdar), Sir Lee Stack, in Egypt in 1924, was used by the British Government to curb Egypt's influence in the Sudan and to evacuate Egyptian troops. British officials on the spot tried to persuade the British Foreign Office to take over complete control and denounce the condominium. The Sudanese nationalist leader, 'Abd al-Latif, was arrested and his White Flag movement suppressed. Had the British then really carried out a programme of rapid "Sudanization" of the administration, the attitude of the Sudanese to Britain might have been more favourable today. To add to this was the dearth of educational facilities in the Sudan. This naturally resulted in many Sudanese going to Egypt.

The revival of political consciousness in the Sudan

The late Mr. Ernest Bevin tried to work out an arrangement with the then Egyptian premier, Isma'il Sidki, who imagined that he had achieved an acknowledgment of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. This was later denied by Mr. Bevin, most likely as a result of pressure exercised by the senior British members of the Sudan administration. For it is known that Mr. Bevin personally was pro-Arab. He must have allowed himself to be influenced by his Foreign Office experts, who imposed a conservative policy on him.

The Sudan nationalist movement was revived in 1938 with the formation of the Graduates Conference. Its leader, Mr. Isma'il Azhariy, should shortly become the first Sudanese premier. I believe it was in 1940 when Mr. Azhariy met the Egyptian Prime Minister, M. 'Ali Maher, in Khartoum. This led to the revival of Egypt's political influence in the Sudan. Political consciousness grew apace. As a result Britain introduced some timid political and constitutional reforms in the Muslim north, and in 1948 there
were elections for the Sudanese Legislative Assembly which were boycotted by the Nationalists. The Mahdiists of the Umma party won ten seats out of seventy-five. These seats were the ten elected by universal suffrage, the others being nominated. So effective was the boycott that in one case the Umma candidate was elected with only 95 votes out of a possible 6,000. Yet in the recent elections the Umma threatened to sabotage the Parliament, although they had twenty-two of their candidates elected, in spite of the fact that they only represented about one-tenth of the total population of 9,000,000. The Umma party in the years after the war kept a permanent representative in England, Mr. Y. Osman, who had persuaded the left-wing Socialist member of the British Parliament, Mr. Fenner Brockway, the courageous supporter of the Kenya Africa Union and of the coloured peoples of Uganda and North, West and South Africa, to accept the Umma as a member of the Congress of Peoples. Mr. Osman tried to make out that the Umma party had Socialist leanings and was not a mere pawn in the hands of the Mahdi and the Ansar. In 1946 the Umma supporters in Britain threatened to revolt if Britain handed back the Sudan to Egypt, but they were not taken seriously in England.

The Graduates' Conference in the meantime had developed into the Ashiqq party, which had Mr. Azhariy for its President, Mr. Nur al-Din its Vice-President, and Mr. Khidr 'Omar its Secretary. This party, which later split in two, won resounding successes in the municipal elections in alliance with the other parties who favoured some sort of link with Egypt, and won practically all the seats in the main towns where there was a wide form of suffrage. This gave a foretaste of the real trends of nationalist opinion in the Sudan which was convincingly reaffirmed in the recent elections. The Nationalist or Unionist parties were formed into a National Struggle Front. Apart from the two Ashiqa parties and their respective affiliated graduate organizations, there were the National Front and the Itihadiyyun, or the Unionist Party, the Nile Valley Party, supporting union with Egypt. The National Front includes a distinguished retired judge, Mr. Derdiri Muhammad 'Osman, and Mr. Merghani Hamza, an architect with a brilliant career, as Assistant Director of Public Works. This party was very close to Sayyid Sir Ali Mirghani, the Khatmia leader. The Nile Valley Party is led by Mr. Derdiri Isma'il Ahmad Isma'il, a veteran nationalist long resident in Egypt. Mr. Isma'il is now Under-Secretary of State for Sudanese Affairs in the Egyptian Foreign Office. He has played an important part in preparing for the Sudanese elections. These parties together with the Sudanese trade unions and both sections of the Ashiqa party were closely associated with Egypt, and particularly with the popular Egyptian Nationalist, the Wafdist Foreign Minister, Dr. Salah al-Din, who then led the campaign for the evacuation of the Suez Canal and the unity of the Nile Valley. The Nile Valley Party was responsible for keeping up Egyptian democratic opinion against the Sudanese, who accepted titles from him. But it must be admitted that without Egyptian money and propaganda and educational facilities, the cause of Sudanese nationalism would have been delayed indefinitely. Side by side with this the Sudanese intelligentsia were striving to break down what they described as the power of the "mullahs" to form one nation and to stop all the nonsensical talk of Khatmia and Umma-Ansar which was being aggrandized by the Umma party and the administration they maintained.

Sayyid 'Ali Mirghani had always lived an irreproachable life and refrained from political activity until the recent elections, when he appears to have urged his supporters to vote Unionist but to have taken no open part in the campaign. He was closely in touch with the experienced organizers and
administrators, the leaders of the National Front Party, Mr. Derridji Muhammad 'Osman and Mr. Merghani Hamza, both of whom had entered the political field after gaining valuable experience as high-ranking Civil Servants. The National Front sought to unify the nationalists and to seek commonwealth dominion status relations with Egypt. All the Muslim Sudanese, including the Ansar, were united in opposition to the segregation of the non-Muslim south. Mr. Mekki 'Abbas, a prominent writer, has denounced the attempt to detach the south and the activities of British missionaries in his book, *The Sudan Question*. London, 1952, which has a foreword by the prominent British authority on African administration, Miss M. Perham. A book, *Islam in the Sudan*, London, 1949, by the former missionary, J. S. Trimming-
of Sir ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. The then Egyptian Foreign Minister’s demand for the evacuation of British officials during a plebiscite was rejected by the British. But in voicing the Unionist demands and by getting the Umma to agree, he prepared the path for General Muhammad Najeeb and Major Salah Salim, who so cleverly outwitted the Umma and got the British to accept the recent elections. It will be recalled that the National Front delegates to the Constitutional Committee resigned over the question of the plebiscite which was ruled as being outside the powers of the Commission by the British judge who presided.

In October 1952 all the Sudanese political parties came to London and saw the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden. They then repaired to Cairo and saw General Najeeb, with whom a compromise was worked out. The Unionists formed themselves into one party under Mr. Isma’il Azhariy and Mr. Nur al-Din. For the moment they were persuaded to take a back seat, and Sir ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and the Social Republicans were given a lot of publicity and persuaded to accept the idea of elections under international control and independence or union with Egypt after three years.

A Sudanization committee is shortly to operate. The Sudanese now hold 85 per cent of the Civil Service posts and the British just over 12 per cent. Three of the members of this Commission will be elected from a list of five to be provided by the Sudanese premier. Mr. Isma’il Azhariy, who is expected to be called upon to lead the Government, has stated that he will rapidly replace British officials.

The future of the Sudan and the responsibility of Britain and Egypt

The recent elections for the House of Representatives contested by 322 candidates were carried out under the Indian Chairman, Mr. Sukumar Sen. Shortly before the results were declared, General Najeeb toured the Sudanese border and Major Salim was particularly active on behalf of the Unionists. Such activities are not only natural, for General Najeeb, who was himself educated in the Sudan, regards the people there with the same affection as Field-Marshal Montgomery might regard the people of the British Commonwealth such as the New Zealanders or the Australians. The Unionist leaders, such as Mr. Mergahi Hamza and Mr. Azhariy, deserve a great deal of credit for the way they carried out the campaign in the South. They have shown that they are certainly capable of providing excellent leadership and providing a Government worthy of any nation. They should be afforded every co-operation from Britain and the British officials on the spot. It is nonsense to imagine that the Egyptians will colonize the Sudan. The land reforms and confiscation of the property of the relatives of ex-King Farouk has crippled the activities of the Pashas, who were in any case too lazy to go to the Sudan; besides, the Sudanese trade unions are excellently organized and led. The strong democratic spirit amongst the Sudanese Nationalist Unionists is a guarantee against any interference. The results are a personal triumph for the shrewdness and moderation of General Najeeb, and it is to be hoped that he will leave the Sudanese people in absolute freedom for the development of co-operatives, democracy, socialism and syndicalism.

The Sudan should receive every help from the British and Western peoples, and more attention should be paid to the views of al-Sarah, the organ of Sudanese public opinion.

In three years at the most the Sudan will ultimately be free. But freedom may come long before then; the repressive measures of the British Government in Uganda and Kenya, and the threat of white domination through the unpopular imposed-from-above Central African Federation, can only have the effect of spurring on the Sudanese to obtain absolute freedom. Only through showing goodwill and by giving constructive support can Britain guarantee the friendship of the Sudanese people, and no attempt should be made to induce them to join the Commonwealth or delay their evolution.

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THE FRENCH AND THEIR RECORD IN ALGERIA

By PHILIP DEANE

"This activity of the settlers has been well rewarded. They control the economy of the country. They run the import-export trade, the shipping, the road transports, the banks, most of whatever industry there is, and they own the best land (between one-third and two-fifths of the arable surface). Seventy large landowners alone own a total of 500,000 acres. . . But the fact is that even if they were willing to educate themselves, most Algerians could not get an education. While there are enough schools for the children of the settlers, there are no schools for five out of every six native children — this after 123 years of French rule. . . . The French claim they have not been able to change this system of land tenure because that would be interfering in something which is a religious institution, and the French say they never do that. Yet they have taken over the administration of all properties belonging to religious institutions. They appoint the muftis and the muezzins and even the sweepers of the mosques, and they have turned these Muslim religious dignitaries into salaried French Civil Servants. Moreover, they have given substantial support to certain religious sects whose leaders they have used to control the population. Through this ‘nationalized Islam’ they kept the rural population for many decades in a state of political unconsciousness”

The reactionary attitude of the French settlers in Algeria

While the French officials in Morocco are eager to show their achievements, those in Algeria take the attitude that if any journalist wants to investigate the country he will have to do it the hard way. They are, of course, polite, but beyond that they will not go. No statistics, no pamphlets, no organized tours, no meetings with pro-French natives.

The French settlers are even more reluctant to impart information. These people, whether they be big planters or small shop-keepers, seemed to have preserved many of the characteristics of their pioneering ancestors who settled in Algeria after the 1830 conquest. For these people, the material well-being achieved by the hard work of their ancestors, and preserved by their own hard work, is the only thing that counts, and they resent journalistic investigations which might help to upset the order of things.

For these settlers France is something remote. Most of

1 Courtesy, the Editor, The Observer, London, for Sunday, 8th November 1953. The article appears therein under the title of “North African Dilemma”.

them do not even go there to university. They study in Algiers. France to them is what helps them preserve their privileges in Algeria. In exchange for this service from France they are willing to fight bravely in the French Army. But if France proposes reforms to improve the lot of the natives, then the settlers openly renounce France and talk of secession, of a “Union of North Africa” which will know how to preserve the privileges the Europeans have earned with their labours.

The story of French Rule in Algeria is the story of the fight the settlers have waged to preserve undiminished all that they have acquired. Their chief opponent was liberal reform dictated by the ideals ruling certain political trends in France and by the political necessities of a changing world in which old-fashioned colonialism was no longer workable.

During this fight the settlers have also done a lot for the country. They have reclaimed land from swamps, pushed back the desert, developed commerce, built towns, planted millions of trees. Whatever is modern and efficient seems to be their creation. Their estates are better run than the estates
of rich Muslims, their factories better organized, better built; and they appear to be kinder employers of Muslims than the Muslims themselves. Today, moreover, they seem to be as active and industrious as their pioneering ancestors ever were.

The Algerian cannot aspire to a high position in his country, although he bears the major part of the tax burden

This activity of the settlers has been well rewarded. They control the economy of the country. They run the import-export trade, the shipping, the road transports, the banks, most of whatever industry there is, and they own the best land (between one-third and two-fifths of the arable surface). Seventy large landowners alone own a total of 500,000 acres.

How have the natives fared during this “fight” between liberalism in France and the retentionism of the settlers? Did the liberal forces of Metropolitan France succeed in imposing a policy of training the Muslims for a greater participation in the economic and political life of the country? And did these forces succeed in ensuring that the Algerian would be taught to love Western democracy through the display of the inherent fairness of the system? Did these liberal forces succeed in preventing discrimination against the Algerian?

Where the fertile valleys finish and the arid hills begin, there also begin the dwellings of the Algerians. Hovels without light, letting in the cold in the winter, crawling with bugs, these dwellings are frequently no more than huts made of branches. The Moors wear rags, go barefoot and are hungry. The officials admit that the Moors eat 1,000 fewer calories than they should eat each day. In 1948, an official inquiry declared that 60 per cent of the rural inhabitants lived in complete destitution. That represents approximately half the total population of Algeria.

Yet, as in Morocco, the Muslims bear the major part of the tax burden. They also serve in the French forces, fighting away from home on the Rhine or in Indo-China.

In exchange for these contributions to the common weal, to what positions can a Moor aspire in Algeria? He can become a government doorman, if he is lucky. The proportion of Muslims in the Algerian Civil Service is less than 2 per cent. Of the 450 doctors practising in Algiers only 10 are Muslims. Of the 200 barristers, 8 are Muslims. Statistics do not show any Moorish architects, engineers, bank managers, or factory directors.

Why is this? Because — say the French — the Algerian Muslims are unwilling to go through the hard work necessary to become technicians, and in any case they cannot adapt themselves to modern techniques.

For five out of six Algerian children there are no schools!

But the fact is that even if they were willing to educate themselves, most Algerians could not get an education. While there are enough schools for the children of the settlers, there are no schools for five out of every six native children — this after 123 years of French rule.

How about the inability of the natives to adapt themselves to modern techniques? Here and there, in Algeria, the French have started what they call Sectors of Rural Amelioration. These are organizations which provide the farmer with the advice of experts, and which also rent tractors and other agricultural machinery to the peasants. These Sectors of Rural Amelioration are part of the French plan for increasing agricultural productivity by improving the methods of the native farmers.

“How do the Moors (a collective name for the North African Muslims) take to modern techniques?” I asked the French engineers who work on such sectors.

“Wonderfully well. They are eager and able to learn.”

“I thought they did not like modern methods.”

“They are not fools. They would rather watch a tractor plough a field than do it themselves with a donkey and a camel. Why should they not use modern methods?”

“And why did they not use them before?”

“Ah well, you see, as they own poor land, and in small lots at that, they couldn’t afford to buy fertilizer or hire machinery. The banks would not give them any credit because none of these Moorish farmers have clear title to the land, and so they were condemned to go on with the wooden ploughs until we came along with our Sectors of Rural Amelioration.”

“Have you increased the yearly Algerian output?”

“No. We’re only token groups. We haven’t begun to touch the problem yet. We’re only show pieces. There are not enough credits.”

The leader of the Hizb Intisaar al-Hurriyyat al-dimukratiyya — M.T.L.D. (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), Mr. Massali Hadji, left, is being removed to France by a French policeman, where he is interned. The French colonial authorities regard Mr. M. Hadji’s presence in Algeria as dangerous to their vested interests.

How did the French settlers acquire good land in Algeria and drive the Arabs to poor land?

Why do the Arabs own poor land? Why do they not have clear title to their land? Under the Shara, the Muslim law, land ownership becomes complicated. Someone can always come along it seems and lay claim to at least a part of your land. Settlers would buy such partial claims to a piece of land belonging to a Moor. Since the land had a French co-proprietor, it automatically came under French property laws. Under some provisions of such laws, the French co-proprietor could force his Muslim partner to put

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up the property for sale. No one would offer much for it to
the Moor. The land went for a piece of bread to an
accomplice of the French co-proprietor who had forced the
sale. The Moor often had to borrow to pay for the notarial
fees which exceeded the price he got for his land. Thus the
large settlers' estates were formed not only by draining
swamps but also by using the confusion created by the
application of Muslim land law to the Moors.

The failure of the French policy of assimilation in Algeria

The French claim they have not been able to change
this system of land tenure because that would be interfering
in something which is a religious institution, and the French
say they never do that. Yet they have taken over the
administration of all properties belonging to religious
institutions. They appoint the muftis and the muezzins and
even the sweepers of the mosques and they have turned these
Muslim religious dignitaries into salaried French Civil
Servants. Moreover, they have given substantial support to
certain religious sects whose leaders they have used to control
the population. Through this "nationalized Islam" they kept
the rural population for many decades in a state of political
unconsciousness.

Even before a nationalist movement developed, even
before the Algerians started demanding equity for them-
sems inside their own country, there was discontent. French
liberals had been outraged by conditions in Algeria even since
French troops occupied the country. The efforts of these
liberals all tended towards a policy that has come to be
known as the "policy of assimilation". To be really fair
which it took decades of social legislation to eradicate. Yet
this policy still has supporters in France, just as in the past
it had enthusiastic supporters among those Muslims who had
studied in France. These men had met the "real French"
in France, the French who had the power to make the
settlers behave, the French who had invented liberty, equality
and fraternity. Enchanted by the world of French univer-
sities, grateful to these Frenchmen who were willing to
adopt the Moors as brothers — these "evolved" Muslims
became the champions of "assimilation". Up to the Second
World War. Ferhat 'Abbas, a prominent nationalist leader,
who today demands independence for Algeria, was pro-
claiming that the Algerians were French, that Algeria aspired
to change from a French colony into a French province.

For a long time, these French-trained Moors were the
only articulate spokesmen of the natives, and all they asked
of France was to be accepted as French citizens. Of course
it had to be done by stages. "Assimilation" had to be
earned. The liberal forces in France worked towards
assimilation, and the settlers with their allies worked against
it because the Algerians, if granted French citizenship, could
outvote the settlers eight to one. All orders from Paris
tending to apply the "assimilation" policy were twisted or
disobeyed locally in Algeria.

Only one "assimilation" measure ever worked. Algerian
Jews were made fully fledged French citizens in 1870. The
settlers fought this measure on the grounds that it was unfair
discrimination against the Arabs! But the settlers had to
give way. The French Government needed a loan to pay
its war debt to the Germans, and the Rothschilds were pro-
viding the loans: part of the deal was this granting of French citizenship to the Algerian Jews.

The settlers never really accepted this
measure introducing what they regarded as an
"alien" element into their Algerian electorate. They bided their time; and they had
the 1870 decision reversed by Pétain in
1940 — on the grounds that it would please
the Muslims. In fact, the Pétain measure
finally disillusioned the Muslims.

The strength of the Islamic Reformist
Movement (Jami'at al-Ulama in Algeria)

Since the last war the "assimila-
tionists" among the Moors have become
nationalists. They have become bitterly
convinced that all promises of equality with
the French are a fraud. Only independence,
they now believe, would give them the
equality they want.

In their new search for independence,
these sophisticated French-trained intellectu-
als came upon the leaders of the ever-
growing proletariat and, also, the leaders of
Islamic reformist movement. The latter,
who could be vaguely described as the
Luthers and Calvins of North African Islam, have, by now,
effectively eliminated from the towns those Muslim sects
through which the French have tried to gain a spiritual
influence on the Moors. These reformists specifically oppose
French interference with Islam, and believe that only in an
independent Algeria could they have real freedom of religion.

The intellectuals and the proletarian leaders, for their
part, are rather confused. They want to divorce themselves
from Islam, because they feel that religion is not a "civilized
and mature" political weapon, and they desperately want
to be civilized and mature. Yet, rejected as they are by the Europeans, they are forced to cling to Islam as the only thing that gives them a cultural distinction and that links them to the mass of their fellow-citizens, who are still very much taken up with Islam. This inner conflict makes them — intellectuals and proletarian leaders alike — uncertain and vacillating in their policies. Their uneasiness is made worse by the fact that they are forced to co-operate with the Communists. (The French can, and do, ban Moorish nationalist publications, but they cannot ban French Communist newspapers published in Paris, which offer space to the nationalists.)

The "reformist" Ulamas, therefore, having no inner conflict and serving their faith with zeal, dominate the scene for the time being. They have a remarkable man, Tewfik Madani, as their Secretary-General, who wants "to use the common bond of Islam and Arabic — the common tongue — to give all the Algerian Muslims a national conscience, and a common will to fight for independence". He patterns his plans on the struggle of the Sinn Feiners, and he is willing to wait, for he feels that time is on his side. He is against fighting (for the present), and he would use his considerable influence to prevent fighting, but he admits that this influence might prove insufficient were certain circumstances to be repeated, such as those which prevailed on 8th May 1945.

The massacre of 30,000 Algerians on the 8th May 1945 by French troops

The extreme misery which is being gradually brought about in North Africa by the unmanageable increase of population had a sort of dress rehearsal in 1945. Abruptly there was less food. The population had not increased overnight, but there had been a drought and the harvest had failed. Thousands of people were dying. Ninety per cent of the cattle was destroyed.

On VE Day in Setif the hungry crowds organized a demonstration. There were crowds of people scratching a few miserable unproductive fields, within sight of the lush properties of the settlers. They were people who had long suffered discrimination with a numb fatalism, because while there was a piece of bread to eat it was senseless to risk one's life in rebellion against the armed Frenchmen. But on VE Day, 1945, there were no pieces of bread to eat, and as happens in any country under such circumstances, the destitute tend to blame their plight on the rich and the authorities. There were, of course, the agitators, who were no longer "assimilationists", but partisans of national independence.

The crowds displayed a nationalist flag and an ill-advised French policeman fired at the standard bearer. The maddened crowds ran amok, and butchered and burnt. The riot spread. Some French towns were almost besieged. One hundred and five Europeans lost their lives. Then the troops came — Senegalese and Foreign Legion, complete with air and naval support. The frightened settlers formed "vigilantes" committees and joined in the repression.

Forty-four villages were destroyed by the French air force. Warships shelled coastal settlements. The troops were given a free hand, and they began a systematic killing; they continued unchecked. It went on and on. The nationalists claim there were 30,000 victims. French officers who took part in the reprisal raids admit that 8,000 Moors were killed. Nobody bothered to find out whether the victims were guilty or innocent; nobody bothered to keep count of the wounded. After this slaughter was over 4,560 Moors were imprisoned.

The people against whom the French carried out this reprisal raid were Berber mountaineers — Kabyles as they are called locally. These the French have always considered as much more reliable than the Arab-speaking townies. They are the same type as the tribesmen on whom the French rely in Morocco.

Although in 1945 the rest of the world was too tired and busy to bother much about this event, France was shaken. An investigation was demanded, and public opinion clamoured for the correction of the mistakes which had led to this slaughter.

The Algerians no longer believe in the small political representation given to them by France

It took two years before a Bill was voted by the French Parliament giving some small measure of political representation to the Algerians. This Bill did not endanger the dominant position of the settlers. Algeria was henceforth to be considered a part of metropolitan France. The Moors, who outnumbered the Europeans eight to one, and who according to the new Bill were supposed to be fully-fledged citizens of France, were to have only half the seats in an Algerian Assembly, itself subordinate to the French Parliament.

They were also allowed to send fifteen Deputies to the Parliament in Paris, but the settlers, too, could send fifteen Deputies. There were promises of increasing the quota of the Moors, once they were "assimilated", and provisions were made for this gradual assimilation. But even these mild reforms have been turned into a farce.

Today, very many Moors to whom I talked do not bother to vote. They laugh when one speaks of democracy. As an example, they will tell you that at the Boudjerba polling booth 500 names appeared on the electoral registers for the elections of 17th June 1951. The Government candi-
date received 800 votes, 300 more votes than there were voters. A high French official told me that for a by-election held on 20th September 1953, a telegram had been received from the Ministry of the Interior in Paris, three weeks before polling day, recommending that Mr. Sid Cara should be elected. The story got out to the newspapers, which announced the results of the by-election sixteen days in advance. This was a case of electoral fraud carried out not by the settlers or the local officials, but by the French Government in Paris. It did not shock the Algerians because they now believe, with some reason, that Paris is a tool of the settlers.

Weak though these may sound, the French offer excuses for their electoral frauds. They have to “fix” elections, they say, because the Algerians, like the Moroccans, are not mature enough to vote. There is no elite in Algeria and Morocco as there is in Tunisia. There, in Tunisia, a solution might be found, the French say, which would show the way for Algeria. But solutions have been tried and have failed already in Tunisia. It is said that these failures are the result of decisions dictated to the Government in Paris by the settlers. If that is so, how have the settlers imposed their will on the Government of metropolitan France?

ISLAM IN ENGLAND

WOKING MUSLIM MISSION AND LITERARY TRUST
Meetings at 18 Eccleston Square, Victoria, London, S.W.1.
“Why I am an Atheist”

The visit of Mr. H. Cutner to the Saturday meeting was briefly mentioned in the last report. The Free Thinker, London, published the following note about his talk in its issue of Friday 13th November 1953.

“Mr. Cutner’s address on "Why I am an Atheist" before the Woking Muslims on 7th November also provoked a long discussion. Naturally, such inveterate theists did not allow him to get away with the argument, and for over an hour he had to submit to some first-rate criticism very well put. But the optimism of some of those present — that one day Mr. Cutner would become a good Muslim — we are afraid is doomed to disappointment. All the same, it was a great pleasure to meet so many hard-hitting opponents.”

Mr. H. Cutner emphasized in his talk that there was no evidence for the existence of God. “I exist, that is what I know is correct, but the existence of a Supreme Being cannot be proved by the objective method. Muslims believe in the Unity of God, and Christians believe in a Trinity, but to me it does not matter at all. I do not see any virtue in believing in one God rather than in a dozen. A television set made by one person or by a hundred craftsmen is all right for me as long as it gives good service. The design argument, which has often been put forward in support of the existence of a Divine Being, is shallow from within. I do not see any design or purpose behind many things in the universe. What is the purpose of the planet Jupiter which is many thousands of times bigger than the earth and has a crust of ice twelve thousand miles thick and a dense poisonous atmosphere about the same thickness. The sun is radiating heat only a part of which is of some use to the earth, and the rest of the heat is just being wasted. What is the use of tape-worms and cancer? What, after all, is the purpose behind all such dreadful things?”

Mr. Cutner also dwelt upon the theory of evolution, which, in his opinion, had thrown religious views and beliefs about the creation of this universe overboard. The speaker believed that Muhammad was a great man who did many things for the good of humanity, but it was difficult to believe in what Muhammad taught about God.

In his opinion, he did not know the why and wherefore of things. To him events just happened. The point that they occurred because God wants them to do so was no reply. A religious person is as much in the dark as an atheist like himself about these matters. Fear is the main cause of all religious beliefs, the speaker contended, fear of something mysterious. The anthropologists have discovered the history and causes of religious beliefs and therefore one could get rid of these primitive and superstitious views on life, Mr. Cutner asserted. In the course of his talk he said that he considered dialectical materialism to be a hoax. He was a mechanistic materialist through and through. Though being an atheist, Mr. Cutner still believed in a moral code for society.

After the talk, Mr. S. M. Tufail said that he was...
surprised to learn that a well-known atheist like Mr. Cutner was dogmatic about scientific theories on which the scientists themselves were not agreed. "The speaker had based his conclusions on the theories of science, which were ever changing and changeable. No true scientist would express himself in such a dogmatic manner because he knows that he might not hold the same beliefs just a few years hence. Did all this complicated universe come into existence by the force of chance?" Einstein, a great scientist of the present day, said that the universe was ruled by a Mind. "This is the one reality which gives meaning to existence, enriches our daily task and encourages our hope and energizes us with faith where knowledge fails." "Was evolution the last word in this biological science on which Mr. Cutner had laid so much emphasis?" Mr. Tufail asked.

Dr. A. M. Jatoi, commenting upon the speech of Mr. Cutner, said, "A few years back people did know the use of penicillin and regarded it as something worthless, but now it is being utilized to save human life and is the most important discovery of the present time. Maybe, in time to come, scientists will be able to discover a use for the tapeworm and cancer. About the poisonous gas around Jupiter, a true scientist would only say that he does not know, as yet, what its real use in this universe is, but he would not say it is no use at all." Maulana 'Abdul Haq Vidyarthi pointed out that the existence of God could be proved by the evidence of revelation. "If God is, he must reveal himself, and he does reveal himself to those who strive after truth," and then he narrated his own experience of the acceptance of his prayers to God at a time when no hope for his life was left.

There were also other friends who commented upon the speech of Mr. Cutner or raised questions.

Mr. Hazim Satric gave a recitation from the Qur'an.

"A nation out of step"

On Saturday 14th November, Dr. Mahmudullah Jang, eminent lawyer and scholar from India and Pakistan, spoke at our Saturday meeting. The subject of his talk was "A Nation out of Step". Mr. S. M. Tufail presided over the meeting. Dr. Mahmudullah Jang had long association with the Woking Muslim Mission and he expressed his pleasure in addressing the meeting. "A nation is out of step," he said, "when the members of the nation do not keep pace with the progressive nations of the world. A nation is out of step when we find in that nation poverty, disease, suffering and ignorance. This is what we find in the Muslim world today. It looks to me as if these nations have come under the orbit of God's wrath. The Qur'an has discussed causes of the rise and fall of nations and, when Muslims have gone against the teachings of the Qur'an, they have themselves brought down disaster on their own heads." In the speaker's opinion, Muslims could get into step again if they followed the West in science and knowledge but at the same time accepted the ethical and spiritual teachings of the Qur'an. The meeting was as usual followed by questions and answers.

Reform in Islamic Calendar

On Wednesday 18th November 1953, Dr. Amir 'Ali, Principal, Agricultural College, Hyderabad-Deccan, India, was to speak on "Reform in the Islamic Calendar", but unfortunately, his plane was diverted to Glasgow owing to heavy fog in London, and he could not personally attend the meeting. Maulana 'Abdul Majid, Editor of The Islamic Review, read out his article on the subject. Dr. Amir 'Ali discussed in this article the possibility of making all Muslim festivals and ceremonies fall on one day, and he suggested that instead of lunar calculations, Muslims should follow the solar system, and that he did not find it against the teachings of Islam.
of the Qur'an or the Prophet Muhammad. Mr. Harold Watkins, of the World Reform Movement in the Calendar, described the activities of his organization towards the reforming of the Gregorian Calendar, which the world is following today.

The Prophet's Birthday

On Saturday 21st November a meeting was held to celebrate the Prophet's birthday. Miss 'Aysha Parry, B.A., a Welsh Muslim, gave a talk on the Prophet of Islam, which was followed by another talk by Maulana 'Abdul Majid on the same subject. Mr. Hazim Satric recited the Qur'an at the beginning of the meeting.

Message of Christianity to the modern world

On Saturday 28th November, Father Thomas Holland, D.D., Vice-Rector, Catholic Missionary Society, London, gave a talk on the "Message of Christianity to the Modern World". Mr. S. M. Tufail was in the chair. The meeting opened with a recitation from the Qur'an by Mr. Hazim Satric. Father Thomas Holland said that Christianity was Christ, and the message of Christianity would be the message of Christ, and the message of Christ was the revelation of God. "God loved mankind first, and we only give a small return. Christ emphasized the note of faith and the note of hope. Jesus Christ gave truth about God and we must surrender to truth. Christ gave the message of love and faith, which the world lacks today." After the talk a few questions were asked by the audience. Maulana 'Abdul Haq Siddiqi asked whether Jesus Christ ever said that he was the only Begotten Son of God. To this the speaker replied in the negative, but added that His disciples stated that it was so, and they must have heard it from their master. To a question by the Chairman, the speaker admitted that the word Trinity was not found in the Bible but some of the verses of the New Testament point towards that conclusion.

The Prophet's Birthday Celebrations at Caxton Hall and Regent's Lodge

After the discussion at 18 Eccleston Square, the audience moved on to Caxton Hall, where the Muslim Society in Great Britain had arranged the celebration of the Prophet's birthday. The main speakers were Maulana 'Abdul Majid, Editor, The Islamic Review, Dr. 'Ali Abdul Kadir, Director, the Islamic Cultural Centre, Lt.-Col. Abdullah Baines-Hewitt, and Dr. Nizamuddin, of Hyderabad-Deccan, India.

The Prophet's birthday was also celebrated on 19th November 1953 at 6 p.m. at Regent's Lodge, 146 Park Road, London, N.W.8. His Excellency Dr. Subandrio, the Indonesian Ambassador, spoke on the message of the Prophet Muhammad. His Excellency Mr. M. A. H. Isphahani presided over the meeting.

Lecture at Oxford

Under the auspices of the Oxford University Society for the Study of Religion, Maulana 'Abdul Majid, Editor, The Islamic Review, gave a talk at Manchester College, Mansfield Road, Oxford, on Sunday 29th November 1953 at 5 p.m. The subject of his talk was "Islam in Relation to Sister Religions".

Lecture at Union Church, Mill Hill, N.W.7.

"The whole Muslim world is celebrating the Prophet's birthday today, and it is a happy coincidence that you have invited me to address your meeting on the teachings and message of this great prophet," said Mr. S. M. Tufail, speaking to the members of the Corner Club, Union Church, Mill Hill, London, N.W.7, on Thursday 19th November 1953. The meeting was arranged by Mr. A. F. Watts, O.B.E., Secretary of the club. The Revd. McLean Lawson, M.A., B.D., took the chair. Giving a brief history of the life of the Prophet, Mr. Tufail emphasized the recognition by Islam of the material, intellectual and spiritual blessings of God on all countries and nations. After the talk the speaker was engaged in discussion for about an hour concerning the various aspects of Islam and Christianity.

Wedding Ceremony at the Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking

"The union of two souls or the merging of two personalities into each other are empty phrases," said Mr. S. M. Tufail, Assistant Imam of the Shah Jehan Mosque, at the solemnizing of the marriage between Dr. Isa A. Samad (Pakistani) and Miss Zainah Buerki (Swiss Muslim) on Sunday 29th November 1953 at 3.30 p.m. at the Mosque, Woking. "Every person is born with an independent and free nature and every soul is responsible for its own actions. When two persons are married, they enter into a sacred contract to live together, protecting each other's rights and fulfilling each other's obligations with a sympathetic and loving heart." Miss Cecilia Grant and Maulana 'Abdul Haq Siddiqi acted as two witnesses. The wedding was attended by about thirty guests.

A new Muslim Society in Birmingham

Mr. Anwar Ezzadin informs us that a Muslim Students' Society has been recently formed in Birmingham with a view to promoting social and cultural relations among Muslim students. Those interested should write to the Secretary, Muslim Students' Society, The Union, The University, Edgbaston, Birmingham 15.

ERRATA

In the December issue of The Islamic Review on page 16 a poem was published by Mr. Hassan Shah-Zaman Khan. He has been described as a Pakistani Muslim in "Between Ourselves". Mr. Khan actually hails from Port of Spain, Trinidad. The mistake is regretted.—Editor.

The Islamic Review for December 1953 in the article entitled "The Influence of Roman Law on Muslim Law":

Page 10 left-hand column, line 27, read 280 A.D. for 280 B.C.

Page 11 left-hand column, line 18, read "than it" for "that is".

Page 12 left-hand column, line 27, read "religious" for "non-religious".

Page 12 left-hand column, line 62, read "much less away" for "farther away".

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BY THE LIGHT OF THE QUR'ĀN AND THE HADITH

The 'Id al-Adha Sermon (1372 A.H.) at The Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking, Surrey, England

By DR. S. M. 'ABDULLAH, PH.D.

"O my son, I have seen in a dream that I should sacrifice thee: so consider what thou seest. He said: O my father, do as thou art commanded; if God please, thou wilt find me patient. So when they both submitted and he had thrown him down upon his forehead, and We called out to him saying, O Abraham, thou hast indeed fulfilled the vision. Thus do We reward the doers of good. Surely this is a manifest trial. And We ransomed him with a great sacrifice. And We granted him among the later generations (the salutation), peace be to Abraham!" (The Qur'ān, 37:102-109).

There are in Islam two great festivals having a religious significance. One of them is 'Id al-Adha, or the Festival of the Sacrifices. 'Id means recurring happiness, and adha means sacrifices. In other words, this festival of ours tells us that real happiness and true joy and pleasure come through sacrifice, selfless devotion, a life dedicated to the service of humanity.

The verses quoted above take us back to the time of the great patriarch Abraham, respected and revered by the followers of three great religions, Jews, Christians and Muslims. The Prophet Abraham had two wives. One of them, named Hagar, gave birth to a son who was called Ishmael. Years passed, Ishmael grew and became a young boy. Abraham became very old and the boy Ishmael was the sole supporter and hope of his old age. One day he saw himself in a vision sacrificing his son Ishmael. Thinking that God wanted him to make a sacrifice of Ishmael, he got ready to do it. Human sacrifice was not the divine object. What God wanted was to put Abraham to a test and show to the world the great and lofty character of this spiritual leader of the three great religions of the world, and also to prove to the world that if Abraham the father observed all the divine commandments faithfully, his son as a true servant of God also submitted to His will.

By this act of Abraham, human sacrifice was abolished from among many nations, and today more than half the world stands indebted to the righteous patriarch Abraham for his noble example in uprooting and eradicating this savage custom.

It is this great sacrifice of Ishmael by that great patriarch Abraham that Muslims commemorate everywhere in the world. The largest and greatest of all these gatherings is the one which takes place at Mecca, where thousands of Muslims from all over the world assemble in the plain of ‘Arafat, presenting a unique and wonderful picture of levelling of all distinctions of race, colour and rank among human beings. Not only are people of all race and various countries meeting together as members of one great family, but they are all clothed in one dress, Ihram, consisting of two white sheets. There remains nothing to distinguish the high from the low; there is a vast concourse of human beings all dressed alike, all moving in one way, all having but one thought, and all uttering the same words:

"Labbaik Allahumma labbaik; La Sharika laka labbaik, Inna 'l-Hamda wa 'l-Ni'mata wa-l-Mulka laka; La sharika laka labbaik." ("I am at Thy service, O God! I am at Thy service. Thou hast no associate. I am at Thy service. Thine is the praise and Thine the favour and Thine the Kingdom. Thou hast no associate. I am at Thy service.")

The significance of sacrifice in Islam does not lie in the act of shedding the blood of an animal. The Qur'ān says:

"There does not reach God their flesh nor their blood, but to Him is acceptable your piety and righteousness, and your being God-fearing and God-minded" (22:37).

The underlying significance is made clearer in another place:

"And to every nation We appointed acts of devotion (sacrifice), that they may mention the name of God on what He has given them of the cattle quadrupeds; so your God is One God, therefore to Him should you submit, and give good news to the humble; to those whose hearts tremble when God's name is mentioned, and those who are patient under that which afflicts them, and those who keep up prayer and spend benevolently out of what We have given them" (22:34-5).

Through sacrifice we attain the nearness of God or become God-conscious. God-consciousness and realization of the presence of God leads to true morals and real virtues. There cannot be two opinions about the fact that no individual nor any nation nor community can exist or prosper without sacrifice coupled with sincerity. So sacrifice, not in the sense of offering body or blood of a person or an animal, but giving up of a thing for the sake of another that
is higher or nobler, is indispensable for the prosperity and progress of an individual as well as that of a nation or a community.

Thus with God, words or claims have no weight. These are actions and deeds which count and those too based on pure motives and intentions. It is not our outward act of sacrifice that matters, it is the killing of animalism in ourselves which is needed; that is, laying down our own lives in the cause of truth and justice if and when needed.

This is what Islam means and stands for. It is this lesson which the Festival of Sacrifices teaches us and should teach us. Muslims ought not to live for themselves alone. A Muslim is pleased to live for others. Our greatness lies in this idea and hence the Qur’anic words: “You are the best of nations because you are created for the benefit and service of humanity.”

**BOOK REVIEWS**


The very title “Mahomet” — which according to the author, a professor of Arabic (p. 29), is the French (transliteration) of the proper name of the Prophet of Islam — leads us back to the dark ages of the Crusades. The work as a whole does not seem to enhance the reputation of the author of the twenty-first translation of the Qur’an in French.

This is no biography of Muhammad: rather the soliloquy of the author after a hasty and sceptical reading of such a biography. He seeks things which do not exist, and is irritated that in the original sources he does not find what he seeks: to wit, which Christian or Jew helped the Prophet to compile the Qur’an, which monk or rabbi gave him the now-Islamic notion of Christianity and Judaism, the life of which Christian saint has been plagiarized to fill the void in the biography of the Prophet of Islam. As an objective historian, which he says he is (p. vii), he has tried to furnish us with all that has been lacking in the original sources.

To get an idea of the method employed, we read (p. 22) that he is satisfied that the Jews of Medina never resorted to proselytizing pagan Arabs to Judaism; a few pages further (p. 29) we read “it is permitted to dream over what probably would have been the life and the teaching of Muhammad, if he had grown up in the oasis of Medina, so fully penetrated by Judaism”.

What could be more natural than for a widow, who had known her husband only for a few months, and who died “abroad” before the birth of their child, to undertake a “pilgrimage” to the tomb of her beloved husband, father of the sole son and orphan, and let the boy at least see the grave of his father? Yet to our learned professor this was a venture, full of intrigues and machinations, in which the poor widow failed (cf. p. 29).

The Qur’an is not an autobiography of the Prophet Muhammad; it is much less his diary. Our author treats it as such, assuming the role of a psycho-analyst. He is again angry that his subject does not yield much positive results. Cannot one revert the process, and psycho-analyse the mind of our author on the basis of this his work?

The first coherent biography of the Prophet had appeared in the Sassanian Iraq towards the end of the seventh century C.E. “What an obsession to ask (p. 5). “Was it born under Jewish influences or Christian ones?” Had he not first to name “Persian influence”? Of course the East is incapable of furnishing useful models; the Arabs themselves are much less capable of evolving this elementary requirement!

He does not give his source (p. 28) when saying that ‘Abd al-Muttalib had five sons; if he consults Ibn Hisham (p. 69) he will learn that he had ten sons and six daughters.

Even the innocent fact that Muhammad, when a young boy, used to work as a shepherd seems to our author (p. 30) a plagiarizing of the fact “that the Prophet Amos was also a shepherd before being called upon as an apostle”.

How uncertain does the reader feel when he finds (p. 31) that “nevertheless it is certain that the founder of Islam had followed, during a large part of his life, the religion of his ancestors”. Proof? Only this, that his uncle ‘Abbas had inherited the function of providing drinking water to pilgrims. Even more than that: “It is permitted to think that a number of pagan elements (survivances de la Gentil) in the Islamic religion have their origin in the attachment of Muhammad to the religion of his ancestors” (pp. 31–32). Or (p. 32), one reads: “There is a quasi-certitude that Muhammad had not been illiterate”. Proof? The verse of the Qur’an (25:5): “The pagans of Mecca said, These are but stories of the ancients, which have been dictated to him day and night.” Yet he would conveniently ignore the verse (29:48): “Thou never didst write it with thy right hand; otherwise the evil-doers would have fallen into doubt.”

The retiring of the Prophet to the Cave of Hira, before being called upon as a prophet, “was not, at least in part, without recalling that of the solitary Christians” (p. 36). And he jumps up with enthusiasm to read in a work of Tor Andrae “that Habel, the future Bishop of Arbele, who related that in his infancy, in the time when he was still a pagan, he used to abandon his herd in order to enter a cave and meditate over the vanity of things human” (ibid).

Perhaps he does not know that the practice of tahannuth was widespread among Meccans long before then. Among several other instances, the grandfather of the Prophet Muhammad is reputed to have had the habit of retiring for the whole month of Ramadhan to the Cave of Hira, as Tabari and other historians inform us.

He repeats (p. 22) the old story that Haneef, the term used by the Prophet for the religion of Abraham and for monotheism, has been borrowed from Aramaic, in which language it means a “hypocrite”. As a professor of literature, he must know the recurrence of the same root in several languages of the same family, without being borrowed in the one from the other, and in entirely opposite senses. The English cold and German kalt are to compare with the French chaud and the Italian caldo where they mean “hot”.

It is amusing if not revolting to read (p. 127) that it was the intrigue of Abu Bakr and ‘A’ishah to appoint Usamah at the head of the last expedition, in preference to Hasan and Husain, and a further manifestation of the persistent conflict between the families of Abu Bakr and ‘Ali. Hasan, the elder brother, was at that time only five years of age: had he to command an army against the Byzantine territory?

Our author may have been satisfied with the results of
his scepticism; he may, however, not be conscious of the possibility that others could be as sceptical of his own erudition and objectivity.


This is supposed to be the counterpart of Welhausen's Muhammad in Medina. It deals with the life of the Prophet from his birth down to the day of his flight to Mecca, with a prefatory chapter on the Arabian background which comprises the economic basis, Meccan politics, the social, moral, religious and intellectual background. The survey of sources at the beginning of the work and the eight explanatory chapters at the end give it an academic value. Concerning the first chapter, the author would have gained a great deal if he had made use of Dr. Jawad 'Ali's recent book, The Arabs Before Islam (in three volumes), as it embodies the latest researches on this subject.

After having perused this work, I am now more convinced that English historians and research students are, on the whole, better disposed to the Prophet Muhammad than their French counterparts. Now, for instance, my latest researches have led me to a book of which I have made use of La Littérature Arabe, by Armand Kahn, which apart from its unacademic nature is full of unreal and degrading imaginary drawings of the Prophet Muhammad. I think the primary object of the book was the publication of those most unauthentic pictures that show the Prophet as a mere brigand or highwayman!

Coming back to our English author, he has not just confined himself to one rigid point of view, but very often surveys contradictory views and chooses one as the accepted one. Such was his attitude towards the question of the rise of Arabia as a result of economic factors. For long this has been the conviction of many Orientalists, but Mr. Watt brushes it away with due justification (p. 3).

I do not, however, find any point in raising the question of whether the Prophet's ancestors were as important in the politics of Mecca as the sources suggest (p. 30), as it is quite obvious that had this not been the case, his uncle Abu Talib would not have been able to protect him from the onslaughts of the infidel Meccans. This is just a small instance to prove that Muhammad's family had a great social and political influence with the chiefs of Mecca.

It seems to me that the beautifully rhythmical nature of the Meccan chapters of the Qur'an has tempted our author to arrange the verses he quoted from the Qur'an in the form of poetical stanzas (e.g., p. 42). I hope this is not a suggestion that the Qur'an is a kind of Arabic poetry, because it is decidedly not, and as our learned scholar Dr. Taha Husain rightly suggests, "Arabic literature consists of (a) prose, (b) verse, (c) the Qur'an," which shows that the Qur'an partakes of the nature of both prose and verse, but it is neither. It stands in a special category of its own.

Talking of the Qur'an (which no doubt must have been the chief source for the writing of the present work), Mr. Watt does not seem to have made any use of the enlightened Tafsir of al-Manar, which is the most modernistic exegesis of the Qur'an. Had he read it, he would not have said concerning Muhammad, "He probably regarded al-Lata, al-'Uzza and Manat as celestial beings of a lower grade than God, in much the same way as Judaism and Christianity have recognized the existence of angels" (p. 104).

This question has been repeatedly raised by Orientalists, but I have here only to point out to them that the very word "al-Ukhr'a" in the verse afara'a'aytum al-Lata wa 'l-'Uzza wa Manata al-Thalittaha al-Ukhr'a (ch. 53, 19-20) is a derogatory term meaning "the low" (see Shubber's Tafsir al-Qur'an (ed. Tehran, 1352 C.E., pp. 1067-1068)). Our author ought to have consulted the Bukhari on this matter rather than the less reliable source of Tabari.

If, however, the author is to be criticized on some of his statements on the so-called "Satanic verses", it is certainly to be admired for his plausible answer to those who alleged that the Prophet had fits of epilepsy. "Opponents of Islam," says Mr. Watt on p. 57, "have often asserted that Muhammad had epilepsy... As a matter of fact, the symptoms described are not identical with those of epilepsy, since that disease leads to physical and mental degeneration, whereas Muhammad was in the fullest possession of his faculties to the very end".


A good observer of Professor Arberry's prolific work will undoubtedly notice his attempt to bring Oriental poetry closer to the understanding and appreciation of Western readers. He has not only tried to bridge the East and West, but also the ancient with the modern. He would write British Orientalists and British Contributions to Persian Studies along with Avicenna on Theology and Fifty Poems of Hafiz. He would also produce books as old as the Mawawi and Mukhatabat of Nifiri and pages from the Kitab al-Luma' alongside books as modern as Modern Arabic Poetry and Majmun Layla of Ahmad Shawqi. His genius is actually timeless: he makes no distinction between an ancient and a modern work so long as they are both good and advantageous to scholars or the reading public.

Professor Arberry's latest is An Anthology of Moorish Verse, compiled seven hundred years ago and translated by him into elegant English verse. This brings our author's poetical works up to twelve and proves that Arberry is a worthy successor to Fitzgerald, the translator of 'Omar Khayyam's Quatrains. It does not prove, however, as it was once suggested to me personally, that Arberry the poet overshadows Arberry the scholar. On the contrary, I think that the one complements the other, and there is no room for the belief that he is a poet first and a scholar second.

The present anthology is a clever rendering of the "Penants", an anthology compiled in 1243 C.E. by the Andalusian Ibn Sa'id. The original Arabic MS, was first edited by the Spanish Arabist, Professor Garcia Gomez, along with a Spanish translation. Whatever the merits of that rendering, it certainly takes a lot to beat the present English translation. It is so close to the original, not only in spirit and feeling, but I venture to say even in melody. The greatest success of Professor Arberry lies in his ability to render the music of the original and to keep the general rhythm. But at times he has gone too far with this idea, so that you hear nothing but jingling sounds, as on p. 119:

Yonder see
Dancing mirthfully
The fire, sleeves shaking
In merry-making.

Or again on p. 140:
Rose-petals sprinkled
On the river, wrinkled

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW


The translation is described by Professor Arberry as experimental, and embodies a novel and most interesting approach to the problem of rendering this difficult book into English. It is not too much to claim that this volume will remain as a landmark in the translation and interpretation of the Qur'an. It is a worthy addition to the *Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West.*


Dr. Donaldson traces the history of the Muslim ethical system from its roots in the Qur'an with extensive quotations from the principal Arabic and Persian writers, and includes a valuable chapter on the Sufi poets. He writes in a clear and direct style, and the book will appeal to the non-specialist, while the student will find it invaluable.


The object of this compilation is certainly not orthodox, and the general body of Christians will doubtless object to its methods. They will probably deny the fairness of pulling the Bible to pieces in this fashion. But the apologists of the Christian Scriptures are constantly occupied in belauding them, and there is no necessity to duplicate their performance; on the contrary, there is room for something of an opposite description, and this is what is here produced. Not the best but the worst things in the Bible are selected: its self-contradictions, its absurdities, its immoralities, its indecencies, and its brutalities.

**A CONTINENT DECIDES,** by Lord Birdwood, author of *A Continent Experiments,* Published by Robert Hale Ltd., 63 Old Brompton Road, London, S.W.7. Price 21/.

In his previous work Lord Birdwood told of a continent whose future was one big question mark. The continent decided and this is the story of the decision. In August 1947 two new nations were launched in pride and hope. Yet very soon an array of problems emerged to confuse leadership and hinder the smooth progress of India and Pakistan. Here is an analysis of those problems.


**BRIDGE TO ISLAM** — A study of the religious forces of Islam and Christianity in the Near East — by Erich W. Bethmann. Published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, Museum Street, London. Price 15/.-

This concise and lucid account studies the beliefs of Muhammad and his followers. It shows the gulf that exists between the world of Islam and Christianity despite their common belief, and depicts the tremendous struggle for supremacy between these two great religious forces. It is only through a proper appreciation of the differences in spiritual attitudes that a bridge of understanding and knowledge can be built between the two religions.


The Ring of the Dove is a unique masterpiece of Arab writing in Spain during the Muslim period. Its author, Ibn Hazm (994-1064 C.E.), otherwise famous as a theologian, here develops a complete theory of courtly love as evolved by the Arabs, a theory which was later to exert a profound influence on medieval Europe and the troubadours. He illustrates his discourse, brilliantly written with many fascinating reminiscences which shed a flood of light on the high civilization of Muslim Spain, as well as with much interesting and original poetry. *The Ring of the Dove,* besides being a most important historical and social document, is a very readable book.


The spiritual autobiography of al-Ghazali, which is one of the works translated in this volume, is closer to the modern Western outlook than any other of the great books of Islam. As a result of extensive reading of Greek philosophy, especially Neoplatonism, al-Ghazali passed through a phase of sheer scepticism. In his description of how he successfully emerged from this he partly anticipates the philosophical method of systematic doubt employed by Descartes. The other work translated here sets out his ideal of how the religious man should order his life from hour to hour and day to day.

JANUARY 1954
WHAT OUR READERS SAY . . .

(The letters published in these columns are, as a rule, meant to be informative and thought-provoking in the interests of Islam. Nevertheless, the Editor does not take responsibility for their contents.)

THE MUSLIMS OF EAST AFRICA
The Central Muslim Association,
The Islamic Review,
P.O. Box 278,
Nairobi,
Kenya Colony.

Dear Sir,
18th November, 1953.

As you are aware, for many centuries Muslims have lived in East Africa and have played a distinguished role in the spiritual and economic developments of these territories. A large Muslim population consisting of Africans, Arabs, Somalis, Sudanese, Pakistanis and Indians is spread all over this country. The decline of the Muslim influence in East Africa has been followed by a period of distressful apathy. We have been living under the shadow of mere illusions and our survival, indeed, is due to the unflinching faith we have retained in the infallibility of our religion. The recent awakening of the Muslim community in the other parts of the world has bettered the Muslim community here, and we now foresee a promise of revival of our past achievements and an emergence from the present state of inactivity. However, it is a matter of great regret that lack of proper organization has left some sections of our community deplorably backward. This serious incongruity has been felt very keenly, and every effort has now to be made to cover the lost ground.

We are passing through critical times. The trend of events point to momentous changes in the political and economic spheres which are to take place in the near future, and the occasion demands that we must make full contribution in re-shaping the future of this country.

In view of this, the Central Muslim Association has decided to hold a conference at Nairobi on the 26th and 27th December, 1953. We fully realize that the distance which separates us is indeed formidable, and due to your other engagements it would be, probably, not convenient for you to spare time to attend this conference; but we trust that the love you bear for your brethren in Islam and the thought of their welfare and progress, which must be uppermost in your mind, will prevail over any other considerations, and you will kindly accept our most cordial invitation to participate in this session of the East African Muslim Political Conference.

Your presence amongst us and your guidance will go a long way to ensure the success of the conference. We earnestly hope, Sir, that your message, in the event of your absence, will be a source of inspiration to us during the deliberations of the conference.

Yours fraternally,
(Dr.) Y. A. ERAJ,
Hon. Secretary,
Working Committee,
The E.A. Muslim Political Conference.

*   *   *

"THE ISLAMIC MERIDIAN"

Dear Sir,
25th November 1953.

Mr. ‘Ali Muhammad has done me an honour by making a comment in The Islamic Review of October 1953 on my article entitled "The Islamic Meridian", published in the same journal of March 1953. He has remarked that my suggestion of the Islamic meridian (meridian passing through the Ka’ba) and the Islamic Standard Time for the Muslim world was new, opportune, commendable and important. He has also appealed to the leaders of Muslim thought to "make it a point to ponder over the suggestion and put it on the agenda for further consideration". To him, therefore, my thanks are due. It is high time we changed our focal point from the nerve centre of Europe to the heart of the Muslim world.

Mr. ‘Ali Muhammad has, however, noticed something in what he calls the second part of my suggestion, wherein it has been alleged that I asked the Muslim world to change the present parallel of latitude, called the Equator, for a new one passing through the Ka’ba. He has, therefore, taken exception to it. Perhaps my learned friend has missed the mark, and I am of the opinion that a second reading will convince him that I did not differ from his suggestion that "the meridian passing through the Ka’ba and the present zero latitude", called the Equator, should serve as the guiding longitude and latitude for the Muslim bloc”. Knowing as I do the importance of the Equator with all its geographical implications, I did not hold that the Islamic parallel (parallel of latitude passing through the Ka’ba) should be the guiding latitude for geographical calculations, although I particularly emphasized the need for giving the meridian of the Ka’ba the status of the prime meridian. The article accompanying the article would also testify to the fact; zero degree was inserted on the Equator (not on the Islamic parallel), while the Islamic meridian was numbered zero degree. The very title of the article would suggest where the emphasis lay.

No doubt I urged upon the Muslim world “to calculate the distance of any place in their respective countries or any other country east or west taking the Islamic meridian as prime, and north or south from the Islamic parallel”. So far as meridians are concerned, I insisted that the Islamic meridian should be the prime meridian. But in the case of the Islamic parallel, I did not urge that it should serve as the "zero latitude", bearing in mind that this function was specially reserved for the Equator to perform. What I meant was that if the position of a certain place on earth was to be determined, north or south, the distance between its latitude and the "zero latitude", i.e., the Equator, would locate the position. But by adding or subtracting about 21° 30’ to or from this distance would determine its position in relation to the latitude of the Ka’ba (for the Ka’ba’s latitude is some 21° 30’ north).

Though of lesser importance than the Islamic meridian, the Islamic parallel deserves to be on the maps and globes so far as Muslim countries are concerned. Because first, it divides the land masses of the entire world into almost two equal halves, of which the most thickly populated regions are within some 30° on either side of it. In the second place, there is a Hadith in connection with the Ka’ba — al-Ka’batu Surat al-Arduh — the Ka’ba is the navel (centre) of the earth. Moreover, there are Qur’anic verses relating to the Ka’ba:

"And from whatever place you come forth, turn your face towards the Sacred Mosque; and surely it is the very truth from your Lord, and God is not at all heedless of what you do. And from whatsoever place
you come forth, turn your face towards the Sacred Mosque; and wherever you are turn you faces towards it, so that people shall have no plea against you, except such of them as are unjust: so do not fear them, and fear Me, that I may complete My favour on you and that you may walk on the right course” (2:149-150).

We should follow the injunction of the Qur’án both in letter and in spirit. The above Qur’ánic verses enjoin on us that we must know the position of the Ka’ba on the surface of the earth, so that we may be able to turn in the direction of it correctly. But the position of a place can be determined only by means of its longitude and latitude taken together. Hence the necessity of inserting the Islamic parallel also in the maps and globes used in Islamic countries.

I should like to suggest further that in the maps, whether of the world or continents or any other regions, and in the atlases thereof, an outline of the Arabian Peninsula of miniature size with the position of the Ka’ba, its longitude (0°) and latitude (21° 30’ north) should be shown outside the main map but within its border lines. This may prove psychologically helpful.

Let me conclude by repeating what I have already said: (1) the Islamic meridian be taken as the guiding longitude, (2) the mean time of this meridian be reckoned as the Islamic Standard Time, (3) the Equator, as it is, be the guiding latitude, and (4) the Islamic parallel also be inserted in the maps and globes. I suggest further that a miniature outline of the Arabian Peninsula with the position of the Ka’ba, its longitude and latitude, be shown in all maps separately.

I quite agree with Mr. Muhammad ‘Ali that the Muslims in the past made a vast contribution in the realms of geography, which has become the basis for the study of the subject in modern times. I should like to point out further that the cause of the unprecedented human progress in various domains noticeable today is attributable, in the main, to the maintenance of continuity of the works done by the gallant children of Islam in the past.

Yours faithfully, SHAH SAYED MUNIRUL HUQ,
Assistant Master, Government
High School, Sylhet, East Pakistan.

* * *

THE LATE MAULANA ‘ABDUL SATTAR OF BERBICE, BRITISH GUIANA

The Muslim Missionary Society,
16 Church Street,
Blairmont,
West Bank,
Berbice,
British Guiana.

Dear Sir,

Assalamu ‘alaikum

Kindly publish the following few lines in The Islamic Review about the sad demise of the Maulana ‘Abdul Sattar of Berbice, who was greatly respected in our part of the world for his piety and welfare work. He was the first Muslim Imam in British Guiana to declare the rights of Muslim women to attend mosques for their prayers. He passed away on the 30th August 1953, and the next day women took part in the funeral service to show their appreciation of his work for them. He showed by his preachings and example that Islam was not a man’s religion alone.

Maulana ‘Abdul Sattar also helped in the establishment of the Muslim Missionary Society in our town. May his soul rest in peace.

Yours faithfully, ‘ABDUL ‘AZIZ (President).

TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

(Continued from page 40)

AGENT IN KASHMIR

Annual Subscription Rs. 16/12, post free; single copies Rs. 1/11
Abdul ‘Aziz Shora, Esq., Editor, Rashni, Srinagar, Kashmir.

JANUARY 1954
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